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SYNERGISM AND NONOBVIOUSNESS: THE RHETORICAL
RUBIK'S CUBE OF PATENTABILITY
A combination device is an assembly of two or more previously known
mechanical elements designed to operate as one complete apparatus.' The Pat-
ent Act of 1952 permits the patentability of such devices which are useful, 2
novel,' and nonobvious. 4 This latter condition of nonobviousness requires the
entire subject matter of the apparatus sought to be patented, in light of the
prior art, to be unapparent at the time the discovery was made to a person
possessing ordinary skill in the pertinent art.' In recent years, however, a con-
troversy has arisen among the federal courts of appeals regarding the necessity
of an additional criterion for the patentability of combination devices:
synergism. 6 Depending upon the definition endorsed by the particular court,
such devices are variously considered synergistic when the individual elements
"result in [a combined] effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken
See, e.g., Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 274 (1976); Anderson's-Black
Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 59 (1969); Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 150-57 (1950).
2 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. S 101 (1976)).
For the full text and a discussion of the utility requirement of section 101 of the Patent Act of
1952, see infra note 74.
3 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 797 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.0 S 102 (1976)).
For the full text and a discussion of the novelty requirement of section 102 of the Patent Act of
1952, see infra note 74.
' Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 66 Stat. 798 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 5 103 (1976)).
For the full text and a discussion of the nonobviousness requirement of section 103 of the Patent
Act of 1952, see infra notes 74-81 and accompanying text.
' Id.
6 See infra notes 131-73 and accompanying text. The term "synergism" derives from
the Greek, syn, "together" and ergos, "work", i.e., to work together or cooperate. The
AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1305 (1966) defines synergism as "[t]he action of two or
more substances ... to achieve an effect of which each is individually incapable." WEBSTER'S
THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2320 (1976) defines synergism as the "cooperative
action of discreet agencies ... such that the total effect is greater than the sum of the two effects
taken independently." Congress, in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, created the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as part of a comprehensive program
designed to improve the quality of the Federal Court system. The purpose of the new court,
which consists of the predecessor Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and the Court of Claims,
is to resolve some of the innumerable structural, administrative, and procedural problems that
have impaired the ability of the Federal Courts to deal efficiently and expeditiously with the vast
range of controversies confronting the federal courts of appeals. The new court has been granted
exclusive appellate jurisdiction of patent cases, thereby removing them and the issue of synergism
from the existing circuit courts. For the full text of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, see
Federal Courts Improvement Act, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25-58 (1982).
For a discussion of the legislative history of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, see
generally H.R. 312, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1981); S. REP. No. 275, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 1
(1981).
For a discussion of proposals advocating the establishment of a new federal circuit
court prior to the enactment of the Federal Courts Improvement Act, see generally Meader, A
Proposal For a New Federal Intermediate Appellate Court, 60 J. PAT. OFF, SOC'Y 665 (1978); Miller,
Future of the CCPA, 60 J. PAT, OFF. SOC'Y 676 (1978).
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separately, " 7 perform "a new and different function" 8 or produce "unusual or
surprising consequences." 8 Those circuits which adhere to the synergism doc-
trine interpret recent Supreme Court decisions'° as requiring, for patentability,
that combination devices exhibit synergistic qualities, either as a prerequisite to
finding statutory nonobviousness or as an independent standard of patent-
ability." In contrast, those circuits which reject the synergism doctrine hold
that the utility, novelty, and nonobviousness standards of the Patent Act of
1952 comprise the sole criteria of patentability for combination devices."
' Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Great MI. and Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950); Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d
647, 649-52 (9th Cir. 1982); Huron Mach. Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222,
224-25 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zinc Co. v. National Airbil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir.
1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th Cir. 1980); Reinke Mfg. Co. v.
Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1979); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v.
Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976).
B Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. at 282; Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pave-
ment Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969); Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip.
Corp., 340 U.S. at 152; Huron Mach. Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d at 225;
John Zinc Co. v. National Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d at 551; Reed Tool CO. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d at 1093; Deere &
Co. v. Hesston Corp., 593 F.2d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1979); Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg.
Corp., 594 F.2d at 648.
9 Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co..v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152; NDM
Corp. v. Hayes Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 1274, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); John Zinc Co. v. National
Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d at 551 (5th Cir. 1980); M-C Indus., Inc. v. Precision Dynamics
Corp., 634 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d at 1093; In-
ternational Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976). For other
definitions of synergism espoused by the courts, see Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,
592 F.2d 963, 970 n.20 (7th Cir. 1979).
'° Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60-61 (1969); Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152-53 (1950).
" Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 649-52 (9th Cir. 1982); Huron Mach.
Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zinc Co. v. Na-
tional Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1980); Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1980); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin Ltd., 628 F.2d
142, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th Cir.
1980); Whitley v. Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1980); Deere & Co. v. Hesston
Corp., 593 F.2d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1979); Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d
644, 648 (8th Cir. 1979); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457
(1st Cir. 1976); Rosen v. Lawson-Hemphill, Inc., 549 F.2d 205, 209 (1st Cir. 1976).
12 Rengo Co. v. Molins Math. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1981); Champion
Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1979); Republic Indus., Inc.
v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 967-72 (7th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the circuit court
decisions rejecting the synergism doctrine, see generally Crossan, Patent Law: Synergism Rg'etted, 56
CHI-KENT L. REV. 339 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Crossan, Synergism Rejected]; Note, Patent Law,
27 Vim... L. REV. 777 (1981-82) [hereinafter cited as Note, Patent Law]; Note, Requirements for
Patentability, Republic Indus., Inc. a. Schlage Lock Co., 48 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 110 (1979) [herein-
after cited as Note, Requirements for Patentability, Republic Indus.]; Note, Synergism and Nonobvious-
ness: The Tenth Circuit Enters the Fray, 58 DEN. L.J. 465 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Note, Synergism
and Nonobviousness]; Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up: Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 41 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 761 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up]; Note, Synergism:
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This note will examine the concepts of synergism and nonobviousness as
interpreted by the United States Supreme Court and the various circuit courts
of appeals. To appreciate fully the context and significance of these interpreta-
tions, a discussion of the historical development of patentability and the theo-
retical framework for synergism is presented first. Then a review of the various
positions advocated by the circuit courts of appeals concerning the role of the
synergism doctrine in determining patentability will be conducted. It will be
submitted that synergism, defined solely in terms of a "result greater than the
sum of the several parts taken separately" or a "new and different function,"
is a condition precedent for finding statutory nonobviousness. An absence of
synergism successfully demonstrates that the patent claim is obvious under sec-
tion 103, hence unpatentable. On the other hand, although the presence of
synergism does not mandate a finding that the device is nonobvious, nonob-
viousness can exist only in a synergistic device. The very selection and arrange-
ment of elements which produced the desired result could have been apparent,
at the time the discovery was made, to a person skilled in the pertinent art.
Properly applied, therefore, synergism, although not an ipso facto determinant
of patentability under the statutory nonobviousness standard, may be a useful
consideration for scrutinizing combination devices under section 103.
I. THE SYNERGISM DOCTRINE:
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT AND THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
A. Introduction: The Early Patent Acts
The American patent system derives its power from a specific constitu-
tional grant.' 3
 Article I, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution empowers Con-
gress "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts by securing for lim-
ited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries."" Since its inception, the patent system has sought
to encourage inventive activity and to promote the disclosure and development
of knowledge beneficial to society." This end is achieved through the utiliza-
One Year Later, 59 DEN, L. J. 359 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Note, Synergism: One Year Later].
Other circuits have left the issue undetermined. Although the Tenth Circuit in Plastic
Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1979) re-
jected the synergism doctrine, in a later case the court explicitly decided to "leave ... resolution
[of the synergism issue] for a later day." Norfin, Inc. v. IBM, 625 F.2d 357, 365-66 (10th Cir.
1980).
13
 For a discussion of the historical development of the Patent Clause of the United
States Constitution, Article I, section 8, clause 8, see generally Irons & Sears, The Constitutional
Standard of Invention — The Touchstone for Patent Reform, 1973 UTAH L. REV. 653 (Winter)
[hereinafter cited as Irons & Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention]; Lutz, Patents and Science,
A Clarification of the Patent Clause of the United States Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949);
Outline of the History of the United States Patent Office, The Constitutional Provision, 18 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 55 (1936) (Centennial Issue No. 7). See also Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 393, 394-97 (Jan. 1960) [hereinafter cited as Rich, Principles of Patentability].
" U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8, cl. 8.
" 35 U.S.C. S 112 prescribes the manner in which the invention shall be described so
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tion of a profit motive. 16 Accordingly, under the constitutional aegis, the inven-
tor is offered an exclusive proprietary monopoly over the discovery for a speci-
fied period of time, currently limited to seventeen years." This constitutional
provision, however, does not authorize Congress to provide indiscriminately
for an award of exclusive rights in every "discovery." The Constitution
authorizes the promulgation of a patent system only for the limited purpose of
promoting the progress of science and useful arts." Accordingly, Congress is
constitutionally restrained from granting patents that effectively remove ex-
isting knowledge from the public domain or exhibit no innovation." Within
that restraint, however, Congress may liberally impose conditions for patent-
ability.
as to enable others to reproduce it accurately:
The specification shall contain . a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor of carrying out his invention.
Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 5 I, 66 Stat. 798 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 154 (1976)). See also
Kitch, Graham v. John Deere Co. : New Standards for Patents, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 293, 341 (1966);
Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 400-02; Note, The Standard of Patentability — Judicial
Interpretation of Section .103 of the Patent Act, 63 CoLum, L. REV. 306 (1963) [hereinafter cited as
Note, Judicial Interpretation].
16 Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. (17 Otto.) 192, 200 (1882). See also Rich, Principles
of Patentability, supra note 13, at 400-02.
17 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 5 1, 66 Stat. 804 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 5 154
(1976)). 35 U.S.C. 5 154 prescribes the conditions of every patent:
Every patent shall contain ... a grant to the patentee ... for a term of seventeen
years, of the right to exclude others from making, using, or selling the invention. . .
Id.
The utilization of an exclusive patent monopoly may have the detrimental effect of en-
couraging the inventor's desire to restrict the supply of and raise prices on the patented
discovery. Consequently, the policy of the American patent system embodies a balancing be-
tween the short-range competitive interests realized by society from the immediate, unrestricted
access to disclosed innovations and the long-range interests of the intangible public loss inherent
in the grant of a monopoly. Note, Patentability of Mechanical Combinations: A Definition of Synergism,
57 TEX. L. REV. 1043, 1057 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Note, A Definition of Synergism]; Note,
Synergism and Nonobviousness, supra note 12, at 466-67; Note Synergism Fails to Add Up, supra note 12,
at 762-63.
18 U.S. CONST. art. I, 5 8, cl. 8.
16 An adversity toward monopolies existed in the United States at the time the ,Con-
stitution was drafted. This adversity resulted from the English practice of granting monopolies to
individuals well known to the Crown for items which were within the public domain. Thus, the
framers of the Constitution intended to limit the ability of the government to grant patents on
discoveries which remove existing knowledge from the public domain.
As the Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) observed: This
qualified authority ... was written against the backdrop of the practices ... of the Crown in
granting monopolies to court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed
by the public. Id. at 5. See also Mintz, The Standard of Patentability in the United States — Another Point
of View, 1977 DET. C.L. REV, 755, 765 [hereinafter cited as Mintz, The Standard of Patentability];
Sears, Combination Patents and 35 U.S.C. S 103, 1977 DET. C.L. REV. 83, 88-89; Note, Patentability
of Mechanical Combinations: A Definition of Synergism, supra note 17, at 1044; MEINHARDT, INVEN-
TIONS, PATENTS AND MONOPOLY 30-35 (London, 1946). See generally H. Fox, MONOPOLIES AND
PATENTS (1947).
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As originally codified, the Patent Act of 1790 required that a patent be
issued only if the innovation was "sufficiently useful and important."" The
Patent Act of 1793 modified the "sufficiently useful and important" require-
ment by excising both the reference to "importance" and the modifier "suffi-
ciently." Rather than being "sufficiently useful and important," a discovery,
under the Patent Act of 1793, need only be "useful."" This utility require-
ment was satisfied if the device actually worked to accomplish a beneficial
result or if it was an improvement over earlier devices." In addition to utility,
the new act required that the discovery demonstrate "novelty" in order to
merit a patent. 23 This requirement of novelty was intended to preclude from
patentability any device which existed in written form or was known or used by
others prior to the time the patent was sought." The Patent Act of 1790, as
modified by the Act of 1793, thereby prescribed utility and novelty as the first
statutory criteria of patentability." These early historical prescriptions for pat-
entability proved a ready touchstone for judicial inquiry for almost a century
and a half. Although the Patent Act was revised and amended approximately
fifty times during the years between 1790 and 1950, utility and novelty re-
mained the only statutory requirements for patentability." Nonetheless, the
" Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 1, 1 Stat, 109, 110 (1790) (repealed in 1793)
provides in relevant part:
That upon the petition of any person or persons ... that he, she, or they, path or
have invented or discovered any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or
device, or any improvement therein not before known or used, and praying that a
patent may be granted therefor, it shall and may be lawful to and for said Secretary of
State, the Secretary for the department of war, and the Attorney General, or any two
of them, if they shall deem the invention or discovery sufficiently useful and important, to
cause letters patent to be made out in the name of the United States. . [emphasis
added].
Id.
" Patent Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, § 1, 1 Stat. 318-20 (1793) (codified at 35
U.S.C. §§ 101-02 (1976)) provides in relevant part:
That when any person or persons, being a citizen of the United States, shall allege
that he or they have invented any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or com-
position of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any art, manufacture or
composition of matter, not known or used before the application, and shall present a
petition to the Secretary of State, signifying a desire to obtaining an exclusive proper-
ty in the same, and praying that a patent may be granted therefore, it shall and may
be lawful for the said Secretary of State, to cause letters patent to be made out in the
name of the United States. . . [emphasis added].
Id.
22 See Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 402-05. Note, The Utility Require-
ment in the Patent Law, 53 GEO. L. J. 154, 156-59 (1964).
25 See supra note 21 for the novelty provision of the Patent Act of 1793.
2*Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 513-18 (1818). See also Note, Novelty and
Reduction to Practice: Patent Confusion, 75 YALE L.J. 1194 (1966).
" See Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 402-05. See also Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966) in which the Supreme Court stated that "the 'new and useful' tests
which have always existed in the statutory scheme ... need no clarification." Id. at 10.
26 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 10. The requirement that a patentable
discovery be "sufficiently useful and important" was excised from the Patent Act of Feb. 21,
1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318-20 (1793), but was reinstated in the Patent Act of July 4, 1836, ch. 357,
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standards of utility and novelty would remain neither unaltered nor the sole
criteria of patentability indefinitely. To the contrary, Congress intended the ar-
ticulation and interpretation of the standards of patentability to be shaped by
judicial analysis and pronouncement."
B. The Hotchkiss Standard of Invention
In accordance with its paramount role in articulating and applying the
standards of patentability, the judiciary added to the statutory requirements a
third criterion: "invention." 28
 In 1851, this first judicial formulation, extend-
ing beyond the statutory utility and novelty requirements, was set forth by the
United States Supreme Court in Hotchkiss v. Greenwood. 29 In Hotchkiss, the
Court rejected the validity of a patent granted for an improved doorknob."
The inventors in Hotchkiss substituted clay or porcelain for the traditional metal
or wood and utilized an opening in the doorknob shaped like an inverted cone
for the insertion of the shank.'" Although the Court found the replacement of
materials to be new, it concluded that the materials, clay and porcelain, were
known previously in the art, as was the method used to fasten the knobs to the
shank." Accordingly, the Hotchkiss Court observed that "unless more ingenui-
ty and skill . . . [are evident in the device] ... than [are] possessed by an or-
dinary mechanic acquainted with the business, there [is] an absence of that
degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute [the] essential elements of every
invention. In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful
mechanic, not that of an inventor. "" In essence, the Hotchkiss invention stand-
ard required an assessment of the level of skill necessary to discover a useful
5 Stat. 117, and remained a requirement of patentability until the Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950,
1, 66 Stat. 792-814 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 55 1-293 (1970)). This requirement, although
unused, was deleted as unnecessary in light of the new requirements. See Federico, "Commentary
on the New Patent Act [of 1952]" in 35 U.S.C.A. 1, 2-5 (West 1954) [hereinafter cited as Federico,
Commentary]; Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 398.
77 Thomas Jefferson, a member of the Patent Board, noted that patent investigations
occupied "more time of the members of the board than they could spare from higher
duties. . . ." The task of developing predictable standards of patentability, therefore, was given
to the judiciary "to be matured into a system, under which everyone might know when his ac-
tions were safe and lawful." Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813),
reprinted in 13 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 335 (A. Lipscomb ed. 1904), VI
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 181, 182 (H. Washington ed. 1864), quoted in Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1966). According to the Supreme Court in Graham, Congress im-
plicitly agreed with the suggestion of Thomas Jefferson and the other members of the patent
board that the judiciary should develop the additional conditions of patentability. The Court
noted that, although the Patent Act was amended, revised or codified approximately fifty times
between 1790 and 1950, Congress avoided statutory requirements other than bare utility and
novelty. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 10.
28 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851). See generally Irons and
Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention, supra note 13.
29 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 5211.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
3° Id. at 262, 265-67.
3 ' Id.
32 Id. at 264-65.
" Id. at 266.
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and new device. As a practical indication of patentability, therefore, the inven-
tion standard required a comparison between the subject matter sought to be
patented and the level of expertise existing before the creation of the device. 34
This judicially sanctioned test reflected the implicit constitutional limitation of
and public policy against issuing patents on discoveries which withdrew ex-
isting knowledge from public access. 35 Thus, when the contribution to the
public knowledge from the discovery was insubstantial or would have
developed without the incentive of the patent system, no monopoly should have
been granted under the Hotchkiss standard."
Hotchkiss, therefore, became the seminal case enunciating the third prereq-
uisite for patentability: invention. 37 For the next one hundred years, elabora-
tion of the Hotchkiss invention requirement remained with the judiciary as the
patent statute continued to embrace only the standards of utility and novelty."
Although ostensibly simplistic in its theoretical formulation, the invention re-
quirement of Hotchkiss proved difficult to formulate and even more troublesome
to apply in the vast array of cases in which the invention standard arose." Even
the Supreme Court admitted that it could provide no exact definition of "in-
vention" to aid in the determination of patentability. 48 Without such a defini-
tion, the Hotchkiss standard of invention proved problematic. 4 ' As a result of
" See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 12 (1966).
" See Irons and Sears, The Constitutional Standard of Invention, supra note 13, at 653-54.
Rich, The Vague Concept of "Invention" as Replaced by Section 103 of the 1952 Patent Act, 46 J. PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 855, 859 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Rich, The Vague Concept].
36
 Note, Synergism and Nonobviousness, supra note 12, at 468 n.25; Note, Sakraida v. Ag Pro,
Inc.: Combination Patents Now Require Synergistic Effects, 15 I-1011S. L. REV. 157, 159 (1977)
[hereinafter cited as Note, Combination Patents Require Synergistic Effects]. See also Rich, The Vague
Concept, supra note 35, at 859. .
37 See Kitch, New Standards for Patents, in THE SUPREME COURT AND PATENTS AND
MONOPOLIES, 161, 183-87 (P. Kurland ed. 1975).
39
 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 10 (1965). See supra note 26.
39 Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151
(1950). For a discussion of the problems inherent in the "invention" requirement, see generally
Deller, The Problem of Invention in the Law of Patents, 28 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 797 (1946) [hereinafter
cited as Deller, The Problem of Invention); Mintz & O'Rourke, Afier Black Rock: New Tests of Patent-
ability — The Old Tests of Invention, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV, 123, 123-32 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as Mintz and O'Rourke, New Tests of Patentability]; Note — Requirements for Patentabiliy, Sakraida v.
Ag Pro, Inc., 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 546, 549-50 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Note, Requirement for
Patentability, Sakraida].
4°
 The Supreme Court in McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891) stated:
To say that the act of invention ... involves an operation of the intellect, is a prod-
uct of intuition, or of something akin to genius, as distinguished from mere mechan-
ical skill, draws one somewhat nearer to an appreciation of the true distinction, but it
does not adequately express the idea. The truth is the word cannot be defined in such
manner as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device
involves an exercise of the inventive faculty or not. In a given case we may be able to
say that there is present invention of a very high order. In another we can see that
there is lacking that impalpable something which distinguishes invention from simple
mechanical skill.
Id. at 426-27 [emphasis added).
41
 Mr. Justice Woodbury, in a dissenting opinion of Hotchkiss, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 249
(1851), accurately foresaw the difficulties arising out of the application of the majority's
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judicial uncertainty concerning the application of the Hotchkiss standard,
judicial interpretation of the term "invention" became more stringent and dif-
ficult to conceptualize as a realistic indication of patentability. This difficulty
surrounding the judicial application of the Hotchkiss invention standard, how-
ever, did not become acute until the beginning of the twentieth century." Dur-
ing this era, many courts, struggling to articulate an equitable interpretation of
the invention standard, developed "rules of invention" in an attempt to
delineate certain objective characteristics of inventiveness. 43 These rules,
however, were only alternative definitions of "invention," rather than objec-
tive guidelines for assessing the creative process. 44 As subjectivity in the deter-
"mechanic of ordinary skill" standard. Mr. Justice Woodbury stated that: the test ... sanc-
tioned here has not the countenance of precedent, either English or American; and, at the
same time, it seems open to great looseness or uncertainty in practice. Id. at 270 (Woodbury, J.,
dissenting).
The Hotchkiss invention standard ultimately proved to be subjective and thus inherently
elusive, resulting in an inconsistent and unpredictable body of case law for nearly a century and a
half. See, e.g., Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151
(1950); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 1979). See also
Edell, The Supreme Court and Section 103, 5, Am. PAT. L.A.Q. J. 99, 99-100 (1977) [hereinafter cited
as Edell, The Supreme Court]; Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra 13, at 404; Note, Requirements for
Patentability, Sakraida, supra note 39, at 549 n.29.
As one commentator notes:
In the final analysis, all that it amounted to was that if the court thought the inven-
tion, though new and useful, was not patentable, then it did not involve "invention" "
and vice versa. The requirement for "invention" was the plaything of the judges
who, as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound
their own ideas of what it meant; some very lovely prose resulting.
Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 404.
42
 For a discussion of nineteenth century approaches to determining patentability, see
Dession, The Trial of Economic and Technological Issues of Fact. I, 58 YALE L. J. 1019, 1242 (1949);
Mintz, The Standard of Patentability, supra note 19, at 768-96; Mintz & O'Rourke, New Tests of Pat-
entability, supra note 39, at 126-27; Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness": A Nontechnical Approach to Pat-
ent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Note, Subtests of
"Nonobviousness. "].
The rapid expansion of technology and industrialization during the twentieth century
caused the judicial interpretation of the invention standard to become increasingly stringent and
difficult to conceptualize. This increased stringency and confusion resulted from the difficulty of
applying the simplistic Hotchkiss "mechanic of ordinary skill" standard to the intricate products
of twentieth century technology. Furthermore, the Industrial Revolution brought an awareness
as well as an apprehension of the possible abuses and harmful anticompetitive effects of patent
monopolies. As a result, courts applied the invention standard in a more stringent manner to
avoid the liberal grant of patents. Mintz, The Standard of Patentability, supra note 19, at 771-77, 774
n.83; Mintz & O'Rourke, New Tests of Patentability, supra note 39, at 126-28; Note, Subtests of
"Nonobviousness" at 1169-70.
" See Cooch, The Standards of Invention in the Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYS-
TEM 34, 56 (W. Ball ed. 1960); Deller, The Problem of Invention, supra note 39, at 801-06; Edell,
The Supreme Court, supra note 41, at 99-100; Mintz, The Standard of Patentability, supra note 19, at
774-75; Mintz & O'Rourke, New Tests of Patentability, supra note 39, at 126-27; Note, Requirements
for Patentability, Sakraida, supra note 39, at 549 nn.29-30.
44 Consequently, the Hotchkiss invention standard became variously, and vaguely,
described as: the "creative work of the inventive faculty," Hollister v. Benedict and Burnham
Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 73 (1885); the "exercise of the creative faculty," Turner v. Goldstein,
154 F.2d 338, 341 (10th Cir. 1946), Hammond Buckle Co. v. Goodyear Rubber Co., 58 F. 411,
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mination of patentability became more prevalent, the judiciary corresponding-
ly failed to consider comparisons between the prior art and the subject matter
sought to be patented, a necessary consideration under the Hotchkiss stand-
ard. 45
 The inconsistent results reached by the courts, employing dissimilar
standards to similar devices, evidenced the difficulty of applying the Hotchkiss
standard.
It was during this period of increasingly stringent and subjective deter-
minations of patentability that the judicial underpinnings of what is currently
known as the synergism doctrine" first appeared. 47 On several occasions the
Supreme Court noted that a device consisting of previously known elements
would not be patentable "unless some new and useful result, an increase of ef-
ficiency, or a decided savings in the operation, is clearly attained. " 4B This in-
terpretation of the invention standard focused on the results achieved by the
conjunction of previously known elements rather than just the utility and
novelty of the act of combining. In due course, this standard was extended fur-
ther to include an examination of the individual elements of a combination
devicê.° The judiciary began to employ the terms "combination" and "ag-
gregation" in an attempt to delineate certain characteristics of a patentable
"invention."" The Supreme Court established that an accumulation of previ-
ously known elements would be patentable only if it produced a new and useful
413 (2d Cir. 1893); the "exercise of the inventive faculty," Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597, 608
(1895); the "presence of patentable novelty," United Chromium, Inc. v. International Silver
Co., 53 F.2d 390, 393 (D. Conn. 1931); the presence of "inventive skill," Ansonia Brass & Cop-
per Co. v. Electrical Supply Co., 144 U.S. 11, 18 (1892). See also, e.g. , Cuno Corp. v. Automatic
Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941) ("flash of creative genius"); Mantle Lamp Co. v.
Aluminum Prods. Co., 301 U.S. 544, 546 (1937) ("inventive genius"); Concrete Appliances
Co. v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185 (1925) ("inventive genius"); Potts v. Creager, 155 U.S. 597,
607 (1895) ("intuitive genius"); Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co., 148 U.S. 674, 681 (1892)
("genius or invention"). See also Deller, The Problem of Invention, supra note 39, at 802, for a list of
ten affirmative and fourteen negative rules of invention; Mintz and O'Rourke, New Tests of
Patentability, supra note 39, at 124-32.
45
 Mintz, The Standard of Patentability, supra note 19, at 772.
46 Under this standard, the individual elements of a combination device must "perform
a new or different function," produce "unusual or surprising consequences," or result in "[a
combined] effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately." See infra notes
204-32 and accompanying text.
47 Note, Synergism Fails W Add Up, supra note 12, at 766 & n.35.
48
 Hicks v. Kelsey, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 670, 673 (1874). See also Seymour v. Osborne, 78
U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 548-49 (1871).
4° Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. (11 Otto.) 310, 317-18 (1881). See also Stephen-
son v. Brooklyn Cross-Town R.R. Co., 114 U.S. 149, 157 (1885).
'° A "combination" device produces a result due to the combined effect of the in-
dividual elements interacting and not simply from the separate action of each. In contrast, an
"aggregation" involves the mere union of several elements, independently performing the same
function in the same manner as it did when used alone, without interaction. Great Ad. and Pac.
Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151 (1950); Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-
Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1938); Palmer v. Corning, 156 U.S. 342, 345-46 (1895);
Brinkerhoff v. Aloe, 146 U.S. 515, 516 (1892); Thatcher Heating Co. v. Burtis, 121 U.S. 286,
294 (1887); Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S. at 317-18; Reckendorf v. Faber, 92 U.S. (2
Otto.) 347, 357 (1875); Hailes v. Van Wormer, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353, 368 (1873).
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result due to the combined effect of the several parts interacting, and not sim-
ply from an aggregation of the independently performed functions." This
distinction between "combinations" and "aggregations," originally embodied
in the rules of invention surrounding the Hotchkiss standard, exemplifies the
underlying theory of the synergism doctrine."
C. Synergism Defined:
Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.
In 1950, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the trend toward more demanding
standards of invention in Great Atlantic and Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip-
ment Corp." In this landmark decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the distinc-
tion between "combinations" and mere "aggregations," a distinction which
had been recognized in many prior rules of invention." In addition, the Court
urged a more exacting level of "invention" for devices consisting entirely of
previously known elements." Although the Court recognized the Hotchkiss in-
vention standard as controlling," Great Atlantic was the first Supreme Court
decision to broach, sub silentio, the concept of synergism." The Supreme Court
held that for a patent to issue on such devices "[t]he conjunction or concert of
known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way
exceeds the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable."'"
The patent in Great Atlantic involved a grocery cashier counter equipped
with a rack for manually moving, from the customer to the checking clerk,
groceries deposited within it. 59 According to the Court, each element of the
device was known in the prior art." As to devices consisting of previously
known elements, the Court noted that the use of such "words of.art" as
"combination" and "aggregation" had been recognized previously as deter-
minants of "invention."" The Court cautioned, however, that such expres-
sions only serve to confuse because the concept of invention, when applied to a
combination of old elements, is inherently elusive." Nevertheless, the Court,
in addressing the standard for determining whether an invention exists, cited
with approval the earlier distinction, distilled from many previous decisions,"
" See cases cited supra note 50.
52 See infra notes 61-73, 178-232 and accompanying text.
33
 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
" Id. at 151-52.
53 Id. at 154.
33 Id. at 153.
37 Id. at 152. Although numerous courts prior to Great Atlantic had discussed, in isola-
tion, terminology supporting a definition of synergism, no court had ever outlined all of the con-
tours of the synergism doctrine. See, e.g. , cases cited supra note 50.
55 Id.
3° Id. at 149.
" Id.
" Id. at 151.
52 Id.
63 Id. (citing Toledo Pressed Steel Co. v. Standard Parts, Inc., 307 U.S. 350 (1939)).
Cuno Eng'g Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941). The Court in Great Atlantic
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between "combinations" and "aggregations."" This distinction prohibits the
patentability of a mere "aggregation" of previously known elements which, in
the aggregate, exhibit no new or different function." Moreover, the Great
Atlantic Court urged lower courts to scrutinize patents involving a conjunction
of known elements "with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbabil-
ity of finding invention in an assembly of old elements. " 66 According to the
Court, the , validity of a patent for the mere aggregation of previously known
elements cannot be sustained when the "effect is to subtract from former
resources freely available to skilled artisans. " 67
Under this analysis, the Court rejected the validity of the patent, 68 noting
that the device merely combined previously known elements which performed
no additional or different function when used in association with the other
elements." The Supreme Court thus held that for a patent to issue on a combi-
nation device, "the conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute
something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the
accumulation of old devices patentable.'"°
The invention standard, as redefined in Great Atlantic, was interpreted
widely as prescribing a higher standard of patentability for devices consisting of
previously known elements. 71
 Accordingly, this decision arguably recognizes,
albeit sub silentio, the synergism doctrine as an appropriate standard for deter-
mining the patentability of such devices. The Court's rationale for this stricter
scrutiny of combination devices was that a patent can be sustained only when it
effectuates its purpose of augmenting the sum of useful knowledge. 72 Ac-
quoted Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545 (1938) which stated:
The mere aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggrega-
tion perform or produce no new of different function or operation than that
theretofore performed or produced by them, is not [a] patentable invention.
Id. at 549.
64
 Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 151.
65
 Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938).
66
 Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950).
67 Id. According to the Court, the rationale for this scrutiny was that:
the function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be
sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources
freely available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old
elements with no change in their respective functions ... obviously withdraws what
already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the resources avail-
able to skillful men.
Id.
66 Id. at 154.
69
 Id. at 152.
" Id.
" Id. J. Douglas, concurring in Great Atlantic, criticized the Patent Office and the lower
federal courts for applying "a broader, looser conception of patents than the Constitution con-
templates" when determining whether an invention was patentable. J. Douglas referred to twen-
ty patents which the Supreme Court has held to be invalid as illustrative of the departures of the
patent system from the governing constitutional standards. Id. at 156-58 (Douglas, J., concur-
ring).
" Id.
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cording to the Great Atlantic Court, a patented discovery which only unites or
combines old elements, with no change in their respective functions, would
withdraw from the prior art resources theretofore freely available to skilled per-
sons." This withdrawal of resources from the public domain is a result not in-
tended by either the Congress or the courts and indeed, would violate the con-
stitutional mandate that new discoveries eventually must become the property
of all people.
D. The Response to the Hotchkiss Era of "Invention":
The Nonobviousness Requirement of Section 103
The increasingly strict standards of patentability, coupled with the uncer-
tainty and inconsistency resulting from the judiciary's subjective search for
"invention," as evidenced in Great Atlantic, prompted Congress to clarify the
criteria of patentability." Two years after Great Atlantic, Congress attempted to
" Id. at 152-53.
7+ Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, S 1, 66 Stat. 792-814 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. Si
1-293 (1970)).
For a discussion of the legislative intent in enacting the nonobviousness requirement of
section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, see H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952),
reprinted in U.S. CODE CONG. AND AD. NEWS 2394, 2400. See also Beckett, Judicial Construction of
the Patent Act of 1952 — Codification v. Substantive Change, 7 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 467 (1955);
Federico, Origins of Section 103, 5 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 87, 95 (1977); Harris, Some Aspects of the
Underlying Legislative Intent of the Patent Act of 1952, 23 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 659, 671-80 (1955)
[hereinafter cited as Harris, Legislative Intent]; Mintz & O'Rourke, New Tests of Patentability, supra
note 39, at 135-38; Rich, Congressional Intent — or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952, in PATENT
PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION 61, 70 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Rich, CONGRESSIONAL
INTENT]; Rich, Laying the Ghost of the "Invention" Requirement, 1 AM. PAT. L.A.Q.J. 26, 32-33
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Rich, Laying the Ghost]; Note, Combination Patents and Synergism, Must 2
+ 2 – 5? 37 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1206, 1206-11 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Note, Combination
Patents and Synergism]; Note, Combination Patents Require Synergistic Effects, supra note 36, at 161-62;
Note, A Definition of Synergism, supra note 17, at 1047-49; Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up, supra note
12, at 767-68; S. JONES, THE PATENT OFFICE 136 (1971).
In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress redefined the conditions of patentability in three
sections. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, S 1, 66 Stat. 797-98 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. SS
101-03 (1976)). Section 101 of the Act, which is a general statement relating to the subject matter
for which patents may be obtained, retains the statutory requirements of utility and novelty. 35
U.S.C. S 101 provides:
Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufac-
ture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.
Id. 5 101.
Under this section, a patent may be granted for the discovery of any new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, as well as any new and useful improvement
thereof. Id. A more detailed explanation of the novelty criterion and other conditions for patent-
ability are contained in section 102. Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, S 1, 66 Stat. 798 (1952) (codified
at 35 U.S.C. S 102 (1976)) provides:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless —
(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or de-
scribed in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior
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eliminate the divergent interpretations of the nebulous term "invention" by
enacting in section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952, a third, more objective pre-
requisite to patentability: nonobviousness." Specifically, section 103 states
that a patent will not issue if the entire subject matter sought to be patented, in
to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or
(c) he has abandoned the invention, or
(d) the invention was first patented or caused to be patented, or was the subject of
an inventor's certificate, by the applicant or his legal representatives or assigns in a
foreign country prior to the date of the application for patent in this country on an
application for patent or inventor's certificate filed more than twelve months before
the filing of the application in the United States, or
(e) the invention was described in a patent granted on an application for patent
by another filed in the United States before the invention thereof by the applicant
for patent, or on an international application by another who has fulfilled the re-
quirements of paragraphs (1), (2), and (4) of section 371(c) of this title before the in-
vention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(f) he did not himself invent the subject sought to be patented, or
(g) before the applicant's invention thereof the invention was made in this coun-
try by another who had not abandoned, suppressed, or concealed it. In determining
priority of invention there shall be considered not only the respective dates of con-
ception and reduction to practice of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence
of one who was first to conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to
conception by the other.
Id.
Under this section, the novelty criterion is satisfied generally unless the discovery was known,
patented, described in a printed publication, or in actual public use prior to the time the
discovery was made. Id. 5 102.
" Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, $ 1, 66 Stat. 798 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 5 103
(1976)) provides:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or
described as set forth in section 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject
matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a
whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter pertains. Patentability shall
not be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
Id.
H.R. REP. No. 1923, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952), S. REP. No. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d
Sess. 6 (1952), reprinted in 1952 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2394 states:
There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly stated in the
present statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of
patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention or lack of patentable
novelty has been followed since at least as early as 1850. This paragraph is added
with the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stabilizing ef-
fect, and also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which
may be worked out.
The second sentence states that patentability as to this requirement is not to be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial
whether it results from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of creative
genius.
Id. at 2401-11.
It is interesting to note that the concept of obviousness was utilized in several Supreme
Court decisions prior to 1952. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Ray-O-Vac Co., 321
U.S. 275, 279 (1944); Saranac Automatic Mach. Corp. v. Wirebounds Patents Co., 282 U.S.
704, 711 (1931); The Barbed Wire Patent, 143 U.S. 275, 283 (1892); Loom Co. v. Higgins, 105
U.S. 580, 591 (1882); Vinton v. Hamilton, 104 U.S. 485, 489, 491-92 (1882).
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light of the prior art, would have been obvious at the time the discovery was
made to an ordinarily-skilled artisan. 78
The structure of section 103 clarified two issues central to determinations
of patentability. First, the nonobviousness test of section 103 is not contingent
upon whether an innovation is equivalent to one in the prior art. 77 Rather, the
test of section 103 attempts to determine whether the dissimilarities between
the discovery at issue and knowledge existing in the prior art would have been
obvious to one skilled in the applicable art.'s Under section 103 analysis, there-
fore, the existence of different or identical elements between the current
discovery and the prior art does not by itself determine nonobviousness. 79
 Sec-
ond, nonobviousness is determined in light of the art existing at the time the
discovery was made, rather than in hindsight. Third, the nonobviousness test
of section 103 was designed to establish an objective test for determining pat-
entability to supplant the subjective scrutiny of claimed innovations that courts
had engaged in prior to the enactment of section 103." Accordingly, nonob-
viousness, under section 103 is measured by what would have been obvious to
a hypothetical person having reasonable skill in the art to which the subject
matter pertains, rather than to the ultimate user of that discovery. 8 t
Although the enactment of section 103 was intended to clarify the stand-
ards of patentability by eliminating all divergent interpretations surrounding
the concept of "invention," it failed to accomplish its purpose. After the enact-
ment of section 103, a divergence of opinion arose among the circuit courts
over the effect of the nonobviousness requirement on the standards of patenta-
bility existing prior to 1952. Essentially, the courts differed regarding whether
section 103 merely codified the pre-existing standard of patentability or em-
bodied a substantive change in the prior law. 82
 Several circuits viewed the sec-
76 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 1, 66 Stat. 798 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 	 103
(1976)).
77
 2 D. CHISOLM, PATENTS § 5.01 (1978). A discovery, in light of the prior art, can be
obvious despite the fact that it and a prior discovery are not identical. The courts may find that
the claimed innovation was so substantially similar to what was known and already existent in the
prior art, that the criterion of non-obviousness is not satisfied. Indeed, the presence of substantial
similarity, if the court so finds, typically will negate the patentability of the claimed innovation.
Yet even in instances where the devices are substantially similar, it is possible for the test of
nonobviousness to be satisfied. In this regard, nonobviousness is distinct from novelty in the
sense that a discovery may be obvious even though it is not identically disclosed in the prior art.
76
 Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 228 (1976).
7° Id.; Egley v. United States, 576 F.2d 309, 313-14 (Ct. Cl. 1978).
8° See supra notes 37-45 and accompanying text.
8 ' Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 229 (1976). See also Graham v. John Deere Co.,
383 U.S. 1, 17 (1965). In essence, rather than an objective test of patentability, section 103
establishes a subjective evaluation based upon the "hypothetical person." In employing this
standard, courts should attempt to be more objective by utilizing expert testimony. Graham v.
John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17; Note, Subtests of "Nonobuiousntss," supra note 42, at 1170-71. See,
e.g., Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 651 n.9 (8th Cir. 1979).
82 This confusion stems largely from the contradictory legislative history leading to the
Act's passage. For a discussion of the controversy surrounding section 103 of the Patent Act of
1952, as well as the decisions interpreting this section in light of the legislative history of the Act,
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tion merely as a codification of the stricter judicial standards of patentability
reflected by later decisions. Accordingly, the opinions of these courts relied
upon pre-1952 case law such as Great Atlantic to test the presence or absence of
" invention. " 83
 Other circuits, however, recognized that the new standards ap-
peared more relaxed than ones previously imposed. These courts interpreted
section 103 as a reinstatement of the more lenient standard of invention articu-
lated in Hotchkiss — the discovery must evidence more ingenuity or skill than
that possessed by an ordinary, skillful mechanic acquainted with the business."
This controversy surrounding the interpretation of section 103 existed un-
til 1966 when the Supreme Court first interpreted the statutory nonobviousness
standard in the landmark case of Graham v. John Deere Co." The patent . in Gra-
ham consisted of an assembly of previously known elements designed to absorb
shock from plowshares in rocky soil and to prevent damage to the plow." The
Court held the patent invalid because it failed to comply with the nonobvious-
ness requirement of section 103. 87
 After examining the history of the patent
system, the case law prior to 1952, and the legislative history of the Patent Act
of 1952, 88
 the Court reasoned that the nonobviousness standard of section 103
was intended as an objective statutory expression of the invention standard
originally articulated in Hotchkiss." The Court stated that Congress, in section
103, mandated adoption of the "mechanic of ordinary skill" standard with
see Harris, Legislative Intent, supra note 74, at 661-62; Kayton, Nonobviousness of the Novel Invention,
35 U.S. C. 103, in NONOBVIOUSNESS - THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 2:101
(1980); Marans, Some Aspects of the Patent Act of 1952 as Interpreted by Published Decisions, 361 PAT.
OFF. SOC'Y 482 (1954); Martin, The Patent Codification Act, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 625 (1954);
Pearce, A Review of Important Cases on Patents and Trademarks Reported During 1953, 36 J. PAT. OFF.
SOC'Y 358 (1954); Rich, Congressional Intent, supra note 74; Note, Combination Patents Require
Synergistic Effects, supra note 36, at 162-63; Note, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 15, at 313-22;
Note, Synergism and Nonobviousness, supra note 12, at 470; Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up, supra note
12, at 767-68, 768 nn.43-44; 2 D. CHISOLM, PATENTS § 5.02(4) (1978); P. GOLDSTEIN, COPY-
RIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE •DOCTRINES 425 (1973).
88 Caldwell v. Kirk Mfg. Co., 269 F.2d 506, 510 (8th Cir. 1959); Hawley Prods. Co. v.
United States Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69, 72-74 (1st Cir. 1958); Stabler v. Bright Leaf Indus., Inc.,
261 F.2d 383, 386 (5th Cir. 1958); Bobertz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 228 F.2d 94, 98-99 (6th Cir.
1955); Kwikset Locks, Inc. v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483, 487 (9th Cir. 1954); Vincent v. Suni-
Citrus Products Co., 215 F.2d 305, 315 (5th Cir. 1954); Wasserman v. Burgess & Blacher Co.,
217 F.2d 402, 404 (1st Cir. 1954); Bobertz v. Gen. Motors Corp., 203 F.2d 912, 918 (6th Cir.
1953). See also Note, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 15, at 317-22.
84 See Brown v. Brock, 240 F.2d 723, 728 (4th Cir. 1957); R.M. Palmer Co. v.
Luden's, Inc., 236 F.2d 496, 499 (3d Cir. 1956); L-O-F Glass Fibers Co. v. Watson, 228 F.2d
40, 43 (D.C. Cir. 1955); Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 536-37 (2d Cir.
1955). See also Note, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 15, at 313-17.
The seventh and tenth circuits employed standards inconsistent with either of the above
interpretations. See Mott Corp. v. Sunflower Indus., Inc., 314 F.2d 872 (10th Cir. 1963);
Helmes Prods. v. Lake Shore Mfg. Co., 227 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1955).
" 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
86 Id. at 19-21.
" Id. at 4, 17.
88 Id. at 3-19.
89 Id. at 14-17.
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Congressional directives to determine the obviousness of the discovery. 90 The
Court based this conclusion on the assumption that the Patent Act of 1952 was
not intended by Congress to change the general level of innovation required for
patentability. Rather, Congress intended to promote uniformity by codifying
the existing case law which construed the invention requirement as one of non-
obviousness." As support for these contentions, the Court noted that even the
legislative history stated that "[slection 103 . . . provides a condition which ex-
ists in law and has existed for more than 100 years, but only by reason of deci-
sions of the courts. " 92 In addition, the Court noted that the first sentence of
section 103 was "strongly reminiscent" of the language in Hotchkiss; both
standards emphasize the pertinent art existing at the time the discovery was
made and both are implicitly related to advances in the art." The only distinc-
tion between the two tests, according to the Graham Court, was that Congress
had substituted the term "nonobviousness" for the more imprecise language of
the Hotchkiss invention standard. 94
Calling for strict observance of the statutory requirement of nonobvious-
ness, the Graham Court outlined the analysis to be followed in determining pat-
entability of a discovery under section 103. 95 Although patent validity is a ques-
tion of law, 96 the Graham Court observed that section 103 analysis lends itself to
several factual inquiries." The Court indicated that the nonobviousness stand-
ard requires a factual examination into the scope and content of the prior art,
the differences between the state of the prior art and the patent claims at issue,
and the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art." Only after making these ex-
press factual findings of primary consideration, the Graham Court indicated,
can a court resolve the ultimate question of obviousness under secton 103. 99 In
addition, the Court recognized that secondary considerations, such as the com-
mercial success of the device sought to be patented, long-felt but unsolved
needs, and the failure of other inventors, may be relevant indicia of obvious-
ness.'°° According to the Graham Court, however, these secondary considera-
tions would not support a finding of nonobviousness under section 103 if it is
otherwise established that a patent's disclosures were obvious.'°'
9° Id. at 14, 17.
91 Id. at 14.
92 Id.
93 Id,
94 Id. at 14-15.
95 Id. at 17-19. According to the Court, strict observance of this analysis would result in
the uniformity and definiteness which Congress sought in enacting the Patent Act of 1952. Id. at
18.
" Id. at 17 (citing Great Ati. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S.
147, 155 (1950)). See generally, Note, Nonobviousness in Patent Law: A Question of Law or Fact?, 18
WM. & MARY L. REV. 612, 621 (1977).
97 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17.
" Id. at 17-18.
" Id. at 17.
"1° Id. at 17-18. See also Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness," supra note 42, at 1172-77.
101 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. at 17. See, e.g., Tokyo Shibaura Elec. Co. v.
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The Supreme Court decision of Graham v. John Deere Co. appeared to have
clarified significantly the requisite standards for determining patentability
under the section 103 nonobviousness requirement. Graham's systematic ap-
proach to nonobviousness, however, failed to unify the divergent standards of
patentability for combination devices which existed among the lower federal
courts.' 02 This failure stems in large part from lack of adequate discussion
regarding the effect of the nonobviousness requirement on the standards of pat-
entability existing prior to 1952. Although the Graham Court emphasized that
section 103 did not embody a substantive change in prior law,'" it did not ad-
dress adequately the question of whether section 103 was intended merely as a
reinstatement of the more lenient standard of invention articulated in Hotchkiss,
or as a codification of the more exacting judicial standards espoused in later
decisional law. In failing to distinguish between the lenient and strict judicial
interpretations of the Hotchkiss invention standard, the Graham Court paved the
way for continued judicial inconsistency. Moreover, although the Supreme
Court has applied the tripartite Graham analysis uniformly, subsequent
Supreme Court decisions have deepened the uncertainty concerning the requi-
site standards of patentability for combination devices.
E. Departure From Obviousness
In Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.'" and Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc. , 105 the Supreme Court again reviewed the criteria of patentability
under the nonobviousness standard of section 103. 106 These cases presented an
excellent opportunity for the Supreme Court to reaffirm the standards of
patentability under section 103 set forth in Graham. In an apparent reversion to
Zenith Radio Corp., 548 F.2d 88, 94-95 (3d Cir. 1977).
Consequently, only in a close case in which application of the primary criteria of obvi-
ousness under section 103 does not produce a firm conclusion, can these secondary considera-
tions be used to tip the scale in favor of patentability. See Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pave-
ment Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969); Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 517 F.2d 535, 541
(7th Cir. 1975); Novo Indus. Corp. v. Standard Screw Co., 374 F.2d 824, 828 (7th Cir. 1967).
' 02 See Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up, supra note 12, at 769; Note, Requirements for Patent-
ability, Sakraida, supra note 39, at 552.
'"' Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966). The Court noted that the revi-
sion "was not intended . . . to change the general level of patentable invention . . . but rather
was intended . . as a codification of judicial precedents embracing the Hotchkiss condition." Id.
Finally, the Graham Court emphasized that the standard employed by the Supreme Court has re-
mained invariable. Id. at 19.
104 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
I" 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
As previously noted, Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 (1966), significantly
clarified the requisite standards of patentability under this statutory standard by mandating a
three-part primary factual inquiry as well as an assessment of various secondary considerations.
Under this primary tripartite inquiry, Graham mandated an examination into the scope and con-
tent of the prior art, differences between the prior art and the patent claim at issue, and the level
of ordinary skill in the pertinent art. In addition, secondary considerations such as commercial
success, long felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of others may be indicia of obviousness. Id.
at 17-18. See also supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
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the more stringent standard embodied in Great Atlantic,'" however, the
Supreme Court in Black Rock and Sakraida appeared to depart from the Graham
analysis of nonobviousness in favor of an analysis based upon the presence of
synergistic qualities.'" Rather than clarifying the standards of patentability,
the Supreme Court's reference to the synergism doctrine in Black Rock and
Sakraida exacerbated the differences of opinion among the circuit courts regard-
ing the proper standard to be applied in determining the patentability for com-
bination devices.
Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co. involved a patented
device which attempted to prevent "cold joints" on blacktop pavement.' 09
This device assembled on the same chassis utilized an infra-red radiant heater
with the component elements of a standard bituminous paving machine."°
Each of the elements of the apparatus was known in the prior art and therefore
unpatentable by itself, although the radiant-heater never before had been used
successfully in the process."'
Affirming its strict adherence to the guidelines previously developed in
Graham, the Black Rock Court held the patent in question invalid because "the
combination was reasonably obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art. ' P112
This purported adherence to Graham, however, was not absolute. While claim-
ing affirmance to the Graham standard, the Court utilized the more stringent
pre-1952 standards of patentability espoused in Great Atlantic, where the Court
required the presence of a synergistic result for patentability." 3 The Black Rock
Court, as part of the obviousness determination, considered the manner in
which the components of the system function together. Indeed, citing Great
Atlantic as authority, the Black Rock Court noted that "a combination of ele-
ments may result in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken
separately [although n]o such synergistic result is argued here.'"" The
Supreme Court then focused on the lack of synergism in the apparatus as a par-
tial basis for the conclusion that the device "was not an invention by the
obvious-nonobvious standard. "15
'°' 340 U.S. 147 (1950). See supra notes 61-71 and -accompanying text.
'° Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 61 (1969);
Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282-83 (1976).
'°9
 Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. at 58. A cold joint
occurs when two adjoining strips of pavement are laid at different times. Id. at 57. Poor bonding
between the strips results because the first strip usually has cooled before the adjoining strip is
laid. Id. at 58. Water and dirt then enter between the strips causing the pavement to deteriorate.
Id. at 58-59.
"° Id. at 58. The radiant heater was used to soften the exposed edge of the cooled strip of
pavement immediately before a new layer was laid alongside, thus producing a more durable
bond. Id. at 59.
"' Id.
"2 Id. at 60.
'" Id. at 60-61. The Black Rock Court dismissed the secondary considerations of Graham,
those of long-felt need and commercial success, with the accurate statement that, absent inven-
tion, such considerations would not indicate patentability. Id. at 61.
Id.
n3 Id
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Although the Black Rock Court recognized the necessity for strict adher-
ence to the tripartite Graham analysis of section 103, it failed to adhere strictly to
it as the proper method for determining nonobviousness. Rather, the Black
Rock references to synergism represent an apparent reversion to the strict
pre-1952 "invention" analysis employed in the Great Atlantic case. Rather than
clarifying the requisite standards of patentability for combination devices,
therefore, the Black Rock decision created further confusion among the circuits
by utilizing both the tripartite Graham analysis of section 103 and the Great
Atlantic standard.
Seven years after Black Rock, in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc. , 16 the United States
Supreme Court employed an analysis similar to that applied in Black Rock. The
Sakraida Court affirmed the necessity of strict adherence to the three-part Gra-
ham analysis of section 103 while employing the language of synergism. The
patent in Sakraida involved a water flush system designed to cleanse animal ex-
crement from the floor of dairy barns."' The apparatus consistecIof water stor-
age tanks, a graded floor for the collection of manure, flush troughs, and a
method of storing and releasing water abruptly onto the dung-ridden sloped
floor of the dairy.'" As in Black Rock, all the individual elements of the ap-
paratus were previously known in the business. 19 The claimed innovative
feature, however, was that the particular manner in which these elements were
combined produced a unique rolling action at the front edge of the water due to
the frictional differentials. 12° Despite this alleged unique advancement the
Court invalidated the patent on this device."'
In reaching its decision, the Sakraida Court reiterated the Graham pro-
nouncement that the section 103 requirement of nonobviousness codified the
constitutionally required invention standard articulated in judicial precedents
surrounding the Hotchkiss decision.' 22
 In affirming its fidelity to the tripartite
factual inquiry of Graham as the proper means to determine nonobviousness
under section 103, the Sakraida Court considered the scope and content of the
prior art, along with the differences between the prior art and the claims at
issue.'" The Court, however, failed to examine the level of ordinary skill in the
art, one of the primary factors in the Graham analysis,'" and dismissed evi-
dence of pertinent secondary considerations."' Rather, the Court cited with
"6 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
1 " Id. at 275.
"8 Id. at 275-77. Operation of the device washed the manure into drains at the base of
the barn. Id. at 276.
19 Id. at 275-77.
120 Id. at 277. This cascading sheet of water effectively cleansed the manure from the
barn floor and achieved strikingly better results than had previous manual methods requiring
hours of additional hand labor. Id. at 282.
"' Id. at 282-83.
122 Id. at 279 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966)).
123 Id. at 280-83.
124 Id.
146 Id. at 282-83.
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approval the Great Atlantic proposition that "combination patent claims [should
be scrutinized] with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of
finding invention in an assembly of old elements." 126 Invoking the rhetoric of
synergism articulated in Black Rock, the Sakraida Court found that the result
achieved by the apparatus could not be characterized as synergistic — that is,
"resulting in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken
separately." 127 Since each of the elements performed no new or different func-
tion, the Sakraida Court concluded that the patented device lacked the quality of
"invention" as defined by Hotchkiss and, therefore, would be obvious to any-
one skilled in the pertinent art.'"
Although section 103 and the subsequent Graham analysis appeared to
establish the proper standards of patentability for combination devices, the Su-
preme Court in Black Rock and Sakraida resorted to the Great Atlantic standard of
patentability, namely the presence of synergism. These references to synergism
in Black Rock and Sakraida have revived the more exacting judicial scrutiny of
combination patents, thereby resulting in renewed confusion among the cir-
cuits. On the one hand, the Supreme Court advocates strict adherence to sec-
tion 103 and the tripartite factual inquiries of Graham as the proper criteria for
patentability of combination devices. On the other hand, the Supreme Court
predicates patentability of such devices upon the presence of a synergistic
result. The Supreme Court has neglected, however, to explain the relationship
among section 103, Graham, and the synergism doctrine. This conflict sur-
rounding the proper standard of patentability for combination devices is evi-
denced by the divergent tests applied by the federal courts of appeals.'"
II. COURTS ADDRESSING THE SYNERGISM DOCTRINE
Those circuit courts of appeals adhering to the synergism doctrine"° view
Great Atlantic, Black Rock and Sakraida as requiring combination devices to
achieve a synergistic result as a prerequisite for patentability."' Under this
standard, the individual elements of the combination device must "perform a
126
	 at 281.
127 Id. at 282.
128 Id. at 282-83. The Court reached this conclusion despite evidence that the elements
of the patented device produced more striking results than in previous devices. Id. at 282.
129 For a comprehensive analysis of the synergism developments in each circuit, see
Note, Synergism: One Year Later, supra note 12, at 361-64; Note, Synergism and Nonobviousness, supra
note 12, at 477-86; Note, Combination Patents and Synergism, supra note 74, at 1215-18.
"° Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 649-52 (9th Cir. 1982); Huron Mach.
Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zinc Co. v. Na-
tional Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547, 551 (5th Cir. 1980); Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus.,
Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1980); Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin Ltd., 628 F.2d
142, 144-45 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp,, 614 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th Cir.
1980); Whitley v. Road Corp., 624 F.2d 698, 699-700 (5th Cir. 1980); Reinke Mfg. Co. v.
Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1979); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Ray-
chem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir, 1976); Rosen v. Lawson-Hemphill, Inc., 549 F.2d 205,
209 (1st Cir. 1976).
13 ' Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 527.28 (5th Cir. 1982).
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new or different function,"'" produce "unusual or surprising consequences,'""
or "result in [a combined] effect greater than the sum of the several effects
taken separately." 134 Accordingly, these circuit courts scrutinize devices con-
sisting of previously known elements "with a care proportioned to the difficulty
and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements."'"
Those circuit courts of appeals rejecting the synergism doctrine' 56 find
that synergism is required neither by statute nor by recent Supreme Court de-
cisions, and that it does not comply with modern patent law principles.'" Es-
sentially, these circuit courts indicate that section 103 and the Graham stand-
ards comprise the only criteria for determining patentability of combination de-
vices.'" Rather than analyzing the discovery for indicia of synergism, there-
fore, these circuit courts examine the scope and content of the prior art, differ-
12 Sakraida v. Ag Pro., Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock,.Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969); Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950); Huron Mach. Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc.,
615 F.2d 222, 224 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zinc Co. v. National Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547,
551 (5th Cir. 1980); Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d at 527; Smith v. ACME
Gen. Corp,, 614 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th Cir. 1980); Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp., 593 F.2d 956,
963 (10th Cir. 1976); Reinke Mfg. Co. v, Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1979).
'" Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152; NDM
Corp. v. Hayes Prods.. Inc., 641 F.2d 1274, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); John Zinc Co. v. National
Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d at 551 (5th Cir. 1980); M-C Indus., Inc. v. Precision Dynamics
Corp., 634 F.2d 1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d at 1093; In-
ternational Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976).
194 Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 649-52 (9th Cir. 1982); Huron Mach.
Prods., Inc. v, A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d 222, 224-25 (5th Cir. 1980); Sakraida v. Ag
Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Great At]. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp.,
340 U.S. at 152; John Zinc Co. v. National Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d at 551; Smith v. ACME
Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d at 1093; Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 648 (8th
Cir. 1979); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir.
1976). For other definitions of synergism espoused by the courts, see Republic Indus., Inc, v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 n.20 (7th Cir. 1979).
15 Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d at 527 (citing Sakraida v. Ag Pro,
Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (1976)).
16 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 546 (3d Cir. 1981); Champion
Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1979); Republic Indus., Inc.
v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 967-72 (7th Cir. 1979).
For a discussion of those circuit court decisions rejecting the synergism doctrine, see gen-
erally Crossan, Patent Law: Synergism R ejected, supra note 12; Note, Patent Lau, supra note 12; Note,
Requirements for Patentability, Republic Indus., Inc. , supra note 12; Note, Synergism and Nonobuiousness,
supra note 12; Note, Synergism Fails to Add Up, supra note 12; Note, Synergism: One Year Later, supra
note 12. Other circuits have left the issue undetermined. Although the Tenth Circuit in Plastic
Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979) rejected the
synergism doctrine, in a later case the court explicitly decided to "leave . . . resolution [of the
synergism issue] for a later day." Norfin, Inc. v. IBM, 625 F.2d 357, 365-66 (10th Cir. 1980).
'" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 546; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plas-
tics, 607 F.2d at 904-05, 905 n.48 (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d
at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 972.
'" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 546; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc.,
607 F.2d at 904-05; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971-72.
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ences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary
skill in the pertinent art. 19
Those circuit courts of appeals rejecting the synergism doctrine begin their
analysis by reviewing the theoretical history of, and doctrines supporting,
patentability of combination devices.'" These circuit courts recognize that the
early Patent Act requirements of utility and novelty were supplemented by the
Hotchkiss standard of invention, 14 ' and that the evolution of this standard
became the peculiar province of the judiciary. 142
 According to these courts,
considerable inconsistency in the interplay and application of these early stand-
ards resulted from the constrained judicial development of independent rules of
invention.'" Congress sought, they observe, in the Patent Act of 1952, to
"start fresh semantically" and to "promote uniformity" among the circuits by
explicitly defining the concept of patent validity.'" Accordingly, these circuit
courts view the statutory prerequisite of nonobviousness as a codification of the
pre-1952 rules of invention under a new rubric: nonobviousness. 145 They then
note that the Supreme Court in Graham established a procedurel" for deter-
mining patentability under section 103 and thereby contributed to the uniform-
"° Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 540-45; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc.,
607 F.2d at 905; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971-72.
' 4° Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 540-45; Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971-72.
14 ' Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 540-41; Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 967 & n.9.
142 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 541; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 967 & 967 n.10 (quoting McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 419 (1891);
Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 404). See also Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
1, 10 (1966); Act of July 8, 1870, ch. 230, 16 Stat. 198.
143 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 541; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 967 n.10 (quoting Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 404).
'" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 541-42; Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968 & n.12.
1 " Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach, Co., 657 F.2d at 542 (citing Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968.
According to section 103, the courts note, a patent will not issue if the subject matter sought to be
patented, in light of the prior art, would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to
an individual possessing ordinary skill in the pertinent art. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657
F.2d at 542; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp„ 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979);
Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 904-05 (10th Cir.
1979); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968.
146 Although the determination of patentability is essentially one of law, section 103 is
subject to several basic factual inquiries. Graham, they note, sets out a three-fold test for nonobvi-
ousness under section 103, demanding an examination of the scope and content of the prior art,
the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue, and the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art. Furthermore, these courts observe, Graham permits consideration of other indicia of
nonobviousness such as commercial success, long-felt but unsolved needs, and the failure of
others. Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 542; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d at
895, 904 (quoting Westwood Chem., Inc. v. United States, 525 F.2d 1367, 1375); Republic In-
dus., Inc, v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968 (quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S.
_1, 17 (1966),
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ity among the circuit courts sought by Congress in enacting the nonobvious-
ness standard.' 47 These circuit courts emphasize that in Graham, the Court
determined the standard of patentability to be based solely upon the nonobvi-
ous nature of the patent claim under section 103.' 4" For these courts, the
Graham guidelines do not require that, for a finding of nonobviousness, the
result achieved by a combination device must be synergistic.' 49 Those circuit
courts of appeals rejecting the synergism doctrine recognize that the recent
Supreme Court decisions of Black Rock and Sakraida have employed language
similar to that of Great Atlantic.'" They reject, however, any notion that the
Supreme Court in Black Rock and Sakraida departed from the Graham interpreta-
tion of section 103. Rather than prescribing an additional or different test for
patentability, these circuit courts interpret Black Rock and Sakraida as merely
reaffirming the Graham assessment of nonobviousness under section 103.' 5 '
The Supreme Court's reference to the synergism doctrine in Black Rock, they
propose, was "merely to note the advent of a phenomenon which may result
from a combination patent, without any indication ... that the phenomenon
must be present in every case to satisfy the requirements of section 103.' 152 In
addition, these courts suggest that, although the Sakraida Court employed syn-
ergism language, the background of the Sakraida decision indicates the
Supreme Court did not intend to revitalize the pre-1952 rules of invention;'"
the Court's reference simply constitutes a repudiation of the lower court's find-
ing that the patented device achieved a synergistic result. "4 Accordingly, those
circuit courts rejecting the synergism doctrine note that neither Black Rock nor
Sakraida reinstated the pre-1952 rules of invention or advocated the establish-
ment of an additional requirement for patentability." Instead, these circuit
'" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 542; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d at
904 (quoting Westwood Chem., Inc. v. United States, 525 F.2d at 1375); Republic Indus., Inc.
v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968.
"8
 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 540; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc.,
607 F.2d at 904-05; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 972.
149
 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 540; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc.,
607 F.2d at 904-05; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 972.
13° Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 543; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968-69.
"I Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 543; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,
592 F.2d at 968-69.
'" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 543 (citing Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 433 F. Supp, 666, 669-70 (S.D. Ill. 1977)); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968-69.
'" Rengo Co. v. Molina Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 543; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 969 & n.17.
' 94 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 543-44; Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 969 & n.17.
1 " Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 969.
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courts recognize the tripartite Graham analysis as the proper criterion for deter-
mining patentability of combination devices under the nonobviousness stand-
ard of section 103. 16
Several circuit courts of appeals, therefore, are convinced that neither sec-
tion 103 nor recent Supreme Court decisions advocate adoption of the
synergism doctrine. These circuit courts further examine the synergism doc-
trine, however, to decide if synergism, even though not required by section 103
or the Supreme Court, would facilitate application of modern patent prin-
ciples. 157 These courts, however, note several arguments which counsel against
utilizing the synergism doctrine - applicable solely to combination devices -
for determining nonobviousness under section 103. 158
First, these circuit courts observe that section 103 does not distinguish be-
tween various types of patents. 159 According to them, Congress intentionally
replaced the rules of invention, which predominately related to a narrow range
of devices, with the single standard of nonobviousness."° Accordingly, they
opine that "it would confound the statutory design to impose on one class of
patents a harsher test of patentability than the rest." 181 •
Second, they note that even courts adhering to the synergism doctrine
have failed to agree on a formulation of synergism readily. accessible to uniform
application.'" Depending upon the definition endorsed by the particular court,
combination devices are variously considered synergistic when the individual
elements "result in [a combined] effect greater than the sum of the several ef-
fects taken separately," perform a "new or different function," or produce
16 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plas-
tics, 607 F.2d 885, 895, 904-05 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Westwood Chem., Inc. v. United
States, 525 F.2d 1367, 1375 (Ct. Cl. 1975)); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d at 97 at 971-72.
137 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 967-72.
Asa Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Plastic Container Corp. v. Conti-
nental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 904 n.46, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Republic Indus., Inc.
v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at
969-72.
1S9 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Plastic Container Corp. v. Conti-
nental Plastics, 607 F.2d at 905 n.48 (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
"° Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 1923, 82d
Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1952); S. REP. NO. 1979, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1952)); Republic Indus.,
Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 968.
161 Rengo Co. v. Matins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Plastic Container Corp. v. Conti-
nental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
162 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544. The Rengo Court suggests a
comparison among Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644, 648 (8th Cir. 1979)
("new effect"), Brennan v. Mr. Hanger, Inc., 479 F. Supp. 1215, 1225 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) ("a
highly desirable new result and not theretofore obvious"), and Burland v. Trippe Mfg. Co., 543
F.2d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 1976) ("at least one clement must perform a different function or opera-
tion than it did previously"). See generally Note, A DOnilion of Synergism, supra note 17.
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"unusual or surprising consequences." This difficulty of formulation and ap-
plication, the courts rejecting synergism state, would exacerbate the inequity of
applying such a standard to a particular class of devices."'
Third, these circuit courts rejecting the synergism doctrine focus on sever-
al inherent analytical defects in the doctrine. The scope of the synergism doc-
trine, they note, because it applies solely to combination devices, necessarily
depends on a proper definition of the term "combination." According to these
courts, however, combination devices as a class cannot be described adequate-
ly because virtually every mechanical device is composed of previously known
elements. 164 These courts note that even if this definitional problem is resolved,
synergism rarely can be achieved and, therefore, is merely a figure of speech.
They assert that the individual elements of virtually every mechanical device
will perform their anticipated functions independently, and will not operate
differently in association with other elements."' Accordingly, mechanical ele-
ments can only contribute to the apparatus their inherent mechanical func-
tions. 166 Therefore; the apparatus will produce a result which equals rather
than exceeds the sum of the elemental functions.' 6 ' As a consequence, these
circuit courts conclude that the synergism doctrine, as thus construed by recent
courts, would prohibit the patentability of virtually all mechanical devices. 168
Finally, those circuit courts rejecting the synergism doctrine address argu-
ments that application of this doctrine is contrary to the fundamental objectives
of the patent system. These circuit courts recognize that the selection of the in-
dividual elements which produce a desired result may be nonobvious in light of
the prior art and therefore patentable under section 103. 169 They point out,
however, that the synergism doctrine only considers the performance of the
elements after their assembly, without regard to the obviousness of selecting
'" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544.
164 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plas-
tics, 607 F.2d 885, 904 n.46 (10th Cir. 1979); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d 963, 969 (7th Cir. 1979) (quoting Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1960),
cert. denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961)).
165 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
16.9 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970 (citing Application of Menough, 323 F.2d 1011, 1015 (C.C.P.A.
1963)).
167 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970 (citing Conner, Some Highly Personal Reflections on Section 103, 5 Am.
PAT. L:A.Q.J. (1977) ("In the real world, two plus two never equals five."); compare Great Ad.
and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Co., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950) ("Two and two have
been added together and they still make only four.")).
' 66 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 969 (citing Reeves Instrument Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444
F.2d 263, 270 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971)).
' 69 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971 (quoting B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir.
1935) (citing Application of Menough, 323 F.2d 1011, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1963)).
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and arranging the particular elements,'" and presumably thereby unnecessari-
ly restricts patentability under section 103. These circuit courts observe that
the synergism test is inconsistent with section 103, which requires the evalua-
tion of patentability to be made in light of the art existing at the time the
discovery was made.'"
Several circuit courts of appeals reject the synergism doctrine, therefore,
because it is mandated neither by statute nor by recent Supreme Court deci-
sions, and because it does not comply with modern patent principles.' 72
 These
circuit courts instead regard the three-part Graham analysis as the sole standard
for determining the patentability of combination devices under section 103.' 75
III. PATENTABILITY OF COMBINATION DEVICES:
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
A controversy among the circuit courts of appeals has emerged regarding
the standard of patentability for combination devices. In essence, the appellate
courts are divided on the question of whether a combination device must exhib-
it synergistic qualities either to comply with the nonobviousness prerequisite to
patentability under section 103 or to meet an independent standard of patenta-
bility."4 The inconsistent formulations and applications of the patent stand-
ards by the various circuit courts has resulted in an unpredictable body of case
law. 175
 Consequently, the unreliability of the patent system has thwarted the
realization of the ultimate goals of the patent system, namely the fostering of
invention,'" by affecting adversely the inventors' confidence in the reliability
"° Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46; Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
171 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46; Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d 885, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971
(citing Rich, Principles of Patentability, supra note 13, at 404, 405-06).
172
 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 546; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plas-
tics, 607 F.2d at 904-05, 905 n.48 (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d
at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 972.
173 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 546; Champion Spark Plug Co. v.
Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d at 372; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d at
904-05; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971-72.
174 See supra notes 129-73 and accompanying text.
172
 This divergence of opinion does not exist solely among the circuits, however. The ap-
proach taken by numerous courts is also in conflict with the standards employed by the Patent
Office. The Patent Office, which has the primary responsibility for determining patentability,
continues to apply the three-part Graham test despite the adherence of several circuit courts to the
synergism doctrine. See 949 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PAT. OFF. No. 1 TM3 (1976);
Note, Combination Patents and Synergism, supra note 74, at 1207.
173 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1966). For a discussion of the prob-
lems caused by an inconsistent application of the patent laws, see Commission of Revision of the
Federal Court Appellate System, 67 F.R.D. 195, 370-71 (1975). See also, Edwards, That Clumsy
Word "Nonobviousnets"!, 601 PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 3, 6 (1978); Note, Requirements for Patentability,
Republic indur., supra note 12, at 117. But see Markey, The Status of the U.S. Patent System — Sans
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of a patent grant. The inconsistent application of the patent standards and the
possibility that a patent, upon which reliance has been placed, may be subse-
quently invalidated, have undermined the patent system through increased
litigation, forum shopping, and the concealment of discoveries otherwise pat-
entable.'" In light of this confusion of standards and its resultant problems, the
need for a consistent standard of patentability is evident.
A. The Evolution of the Synergism Doctrine:
Combination/Aggregation Distinction
1. Etymological Derivation of "Synergism"
A proper analysis of whether a combination device must exhibit synergis-
tic qualities to merit a patent must begin with a definition and discussion of the
concept of synergism. The term "synergism" derives from the Greek, syn,
"together," and ergos, "work," that is, to work together or cooperate. 18 Ac-
cordingly, a definition of synergism that reflects its etymology requires that the
elements of a mechanical device cooperate or interact with each other. 179 By its
etymology, therefore, synergism should distinguish those discoveries which are
"combinations" from those which are mere "aggregations." The elements of
a "combination" must cooperate integrally, producing a result due to the com-
bined effect of the several parts and not simply from the separate action of
each.'" In contrast, an "aggregation" implies the mere union of two or more
unrelated elements, independently performing the same function in the same
way as they did when used alone, without interaction or cooperation."'
2. Judicial Application: Combination/Aggregation Distinction as a Condition
Precedent of the Hotchkiss Invention Standard
A distinction between "combinations" and "aggregations" exists in the
case law addressing the standards of patentability, first appearing as the
Myth, Sans Fiction, 59 J. PAT. OFF. SOC'Y 164, 168 (1977).
1 " See cases cited supra notes 130, 136.
"8 Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 n.23 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing the Oxford English Dictionary (Claredon Press) (1919)). See Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra
note 74, at 43-44.
"9 Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
"° Id. See also Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147,
151 (1950); Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549-50 (1938); Palmer
v. Corning, 156 U.S. 342, 345-46 (1895); Brinkerhoff v. Aloe, 146 U.S. 515, 516 (1892);
Thatcher Heating Co. v. Burtis, 121 U.S. 286, 294 (1887); Pickering v. McCullough, 104 U.S.
(11 Otto.) 310, 317-18 (1881); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. (2 Otto.) 347, 357 (1875); Hades
v. Van Wormer, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 353, 368 (1873).
181 Republic Indus., Inc: v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 1979). See
also cases cited supra note 50. This dichotomy can best be expressed by the example of a clock
radio, although not a mechanical device. If the clock is utilized to activate the radio at a particular
time, there is an interaction between the elements, hence a "combination." In contrast,
however, where the elements are merely positioned together, yet each operates individually,
without interaction, a mere "aggregation" exists.
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judiciary struggled to articulate objective rules for finding the presence of an
"invention.'" 82
 Under these early rules, the term "combination" was em-
ployed to designate a device, consisting of two or more previously known ele-
ments, a patentable "invention" because the results it produced were due to
the interaction of its component parts.'" In contrast, the term "aggregation"
referred to a device, again consisting of two or more previously known ele-
ments, in which the component parts continued to operate independently of
each other, with no unique interaction, and hence lacking the requisite charac-
teristics of "invention."'"
The Great Atlantic Court recognized this distinction between "combina-
tions" and "aggregations" by citing a rule of invention which had been con-
densed from many previous decisions. 185 The Court observed that "[t]he mere
aggregation of a number of old parts or elements which, in the aggregation,
perform or produce no new or different function than that theretofore per-
formed or produced by them, is not [a] patentable invention."'" The Court
found that the device in question merely "united old elements with no change
in their respectiVe functions"' "
 and that the elements did not "perform an ad-
ditional or different function in the combination than they perform out of
it." 188
 Because the device before the Court in Great Atlantic did not evidence
these inherent qualities of a "combination," the Court, without explicitly stat-
ing so, thereby found the device to be an "aggregation" of old elements, which
by definition lacked "inventiveness" and was, under the prevailing judicial
standard, unpatentable.' 89
Although the Great Atlantic Court recognized and utilized this distinction
between "combinations" and "aggregations," it noted that such a standard
was insufficient as the sole determinant of patentability under the invention
standard. According to the Great Atlantic Court, use of the term "combination"
to signify that a device constitutes a patentable "invention" results in confu-
182 The Hotchkiss standard of invention required all patentable devices to "evidence
more ingenuity and skill ... than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business." Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 266 (1851). In an attempt to objec-
tively delineate certain characteristics of a patentable "invention," the judiciary articulated
"rules of invention." See supra 37-52 and accompanying text. See also Cooch, The Standards of In-
vention in the Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 34, 56 (W. Ball ed. 1960); Deller, The
Problem of Invention, supra note 39, at 801-02; Edell, The Supreme Court, supra note 41, at 99-100;
Mintz, The Standards of Patentability, supra note 19, at 774-75; Mintz & O'Rourke, New Tests of
Patentability, supra note 39, at 126-27; Note, Requirements of Patentability, Sakraida, supra note 39, at
549 nn.29-30.
1 " See cases cited supra note 50.
'" Id.
1 " Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151
(1950).
' 86 Id. at 151 (citing Lincoln Eng'g Co. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549
(1937)). In addition, the Court emphasized that "the conjunction or concert of known elements
must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its parts is the
accumulation of old devices a patentable invention." Id. at 152.
1 " Id.
1 " Id. at 153.
189
 Id. at 150-53.
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sion.' 9° Futhermore, the concept of "invention," the Court noted, is inherent-
ly elusive when applied to a "combination" of old elements.'"
This distinction the Court draws between "combinations" and "inven-
tions" can be explained as follows: while a "combination" must exist for there
to be a patentable "invention," the mere fact that a "combination" exists,
does not necessarily indicate that a patentable "invention" exists — while all
"inventions" must be "combinations," not all "combinations" are "inven-
tions." This incongruity of equating the term "combination," properly de-
fined, to the invention standard results from the different focus of the terms
"combination" and "invention." Whereas the term "combination" ad-
dresses the existence of physical interaction of individual elements in a device,
the term "invention" addresses the degree of skill needed to create the device.
Indeed, satisfaction of the invention standard requires something more than
the mere interaction of the component elements. The presence of a "combina-
tion," defined as two or more elements interacting to produce a desired result,
does not mandate a finding that the device evidences "more ingenuity and skill
. . than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the
business" under the Hotchkiss standard. 192 The desired effect produced through
the selection, arrangement and interaction of the component elements quite
possibly could have been the "work of a skillful mechanic, not that of an inven-
tor." 193 Therefore, although the presence of a "combination" is a condition
precedent to finding inventiveness, there can be some "combinations" which
are not "inventions."'" In contrast, however, the absence of interaction, as
found in an "aggregation," can be employed as the sole determinant of the
absence of "invention." This absence of interaction indicates that the device
lacks "that degree of skill and ingenuity which constitute essential elements of
every invention." /95
Recognizing that the "combination/aggregation" distinction is only a
condition precedent to a finding of "invention," the Great Atlantic Court at-
tempted to dispel any inappropriate equation of this distinction to the standard
of invention. The Great Atlantic Court thereby attempted to redefine the stand-
ard of patentability for devices consisting of previously known elements by add-
ing a new dimension: unusual and surprising. According to the Court, only
such devices producing "unusual and surprising consequences" from the in-
teraction of their elements are patentable.' 96 Thus, the Court espoused a
' 9° Id. at 151.
191 Id.
192 Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248, 267 (1851).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 151
(1950).
196 Id. at 152. Thus, the Great Atlantic decision contains "combination/aggregation"
language as well as reference to the invention standard of patentability. Accordingly, the Great
Atlantic Court merely engrafted onto the "combination/aggregation" distinction the Hotchkiss in-
vention standard.
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double-barrelled approach to patentability. Under Great Atlantic, a device con-
sisting of several previously known elements may be patentable if, in addition
to being a "combination," properly defined, it satisfies the invention require-
ment, defined in terms of "unusual and surprising consequences." A finding
that a device was a "combination" of previously known elements, therefore,
was merely a condition precedent to a finding that it was "inventive"; whether
a device was a "combination" was not a separate test of patentability, but
rather simply a sub-test of the judicially espoused invention standard. 197 Under
the Great Atlantic standard, however, an "aggregation" definitely is not patent-
able; an "aggregation" does not require more skill and ingenuity than that
possessed by an ordinary mechanic.
This standard of patentability articulated in Great Atlantic, requiring
devices consisting of previously known elements to be both "combinations"
and "unusual and surprising," was not entirely apparent to the various circuit
courts of appeals. As a result, the appellate courts continued to employ rules of
invention in an attempt to delineate certain objective characteristics of "inven-
tion." ' 88
3. Patent Act of 1952: Nonobviousness as a Codification of the Hotchkiss
Invention Standard
To help resolve this confusion among the courts, Congress, in the Patent
Act of 1952, attempted to eliminate the disparate judicial interpretations of the
invention standard by enacting a more objective standard of patentability in
section 103: nonobviousness. 199 Section 103 codifies language which has been
used in numerous court decisions since the imposition of the Hotchkiss invention
standard. 20° As the Supreme Court noted in Graham, the nonobviousness
standard of section 103 was intended as an objective statutory expression of ju-
dicial decisions embracing the Hotchkiss standard."' Accordingly, "nonobvi-
ousness" was merely a new rubric for the old invention requirement, defined
in terms of "more ingenuity and skill ... than that possessed by an ordinary
mechanic acquainted with the business" under Hotchkiss or "unusual or sur-
prising consequences" under Great Atlantic.
4. Synergism: Combination/Aggregation Distinction as a Condition
Precedent of Nonobviousness
The analysis established in Great Atlantic, therefore, requiring devices to be
both "combinations" and "inventive," was not eviscerated by the enactment
of the apparently uniform nonobviousness requirement of section 103. As a
197
 Id. at 152.
' 9° See cases cited supra notes 83-84.
199 Patent Act of 1952, ch. 950, 5 I, 66 Stat. 798 (1952) (codified at 35 U.S.C. 103
(1976). See supra note 74.
20) Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3-4, 15, 17 (1966).
201 Id. See supra notes 88-94 and accompanying text.
May 1983]	 SYNERGISM AND NON-OBVIOUSNESS	 727
result, the Supreme Court has continued to require, under the nonobviousness
standard of section 103, the interaction of elements in devices consisting of pre-
viously known components.'" Although the Supreme Court in Graham, Black
Rock and Sakraida has reaffirmed the necessity of strict observance of the tripar-
tite Graham analysis of section 103, 203 this observance is not inconsistent with
the requirement that such devices be "combinations." An analysis of the vari-
ous definitions of synergism, as articulated by the Supreme Court, and utilized
by the various circuit courts of appeals, will demonstrate that the Court's use of
the synergism doctrine, defined in terms of a "new and different function" or a
"greater effect" is merely a rhetorical means for distinguishing "combina-
tions" from "aggregations" — that is, for isolating those devices which exhibit
the requisite interaction among the component parts. Accordingly, the syner-
gism doctrine, as thus defined is only a judicial application of the "combina-
tion/aggregation" distinction couched in the language of synergism, rather
than an additional, separate test of patentability. Therefore, just as the exist-
ence of a "combination" was a condition precedent to finding "invention"
prior to 1952, a finding of synergism is a condition precedent for finding non-
obviousness under section 103. In addition, the following analysis will demon-
strate that while the requirement that a combination device produce "unusual
and surprising results" has been attributed to the synergism doctrine, it more
clearly pertains to the nonobviousness prerequisite of section 103.
B. Synergism Defined:
Rhetorical Application of the Combination/Aggregation Distinction
Although many definitions of synergism have been enunciated, 204 com-
bination devices are most commonly considered synergistic when the individ-
202 As the Supreme Court noted in the Sakraida decision, analysis of the nonobviousness
under the tripartite Graham inquiry will be affected by the fact that the device is composed of
previously known elements. Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976). In that deci-
sion, although the Court held the manure cleaning device nonobvious under section 103, it also
found that the "patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it
had been known to perform;" several commentators argue, however, that in light of the context
of the opinion, the Court's reference to synergism was in response to the Fifth Circuit Court of
Appeals' assertion that synergism was present. See, e.g., Rich, Laying the Ghost, supra note 74, at
517; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970-71 (7th Cir. 1979).
The Black Rock Court, in similar fashion, noted that the combination of elements did not
result in an "effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately." Several com-
mentators state, however, that the Court did not intend to propose any additional condition of
patentability or to reaffirm synergism as a prerequisite of finding nonobviousness. In their view,
the Supreme Court's reference to synergism is an assertion that devices consisting of more than
one element sometimes produce results which either are or seem unattainable by the separate ac-
tion of the components. Id. Without explicitly stating, the Black Rock and Sakraida Courts found
the devices to be an "aggregation" of previously known elements, which by definition, therefore,
lacked "inventiveness."
200 See, e.g., Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 62
(1969); Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 279-80 (1976).
20+ Set, e.g., Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 nn.21-22 (7th
Cir. 1979). Ste also cases cited infra note 207.
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ual elements perform "a new or different function, "R 05
 "result in a [combined]
effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately, " 206 or create
"unusual or surprising consequences. " 5207
1. At Least One Element Performs a New or Different Function
According to the first definition of synergism, the elements of a combina-
tion device produce a synergistic result when "at least one element functions
differently in combination than it did previously."'" Those courts which
refuse to adhere to the synergism doctrine maintain that the elements of a com-
bination device cannot function differently in the apparatus than they did
previously.'" According to these courts, a mechanical element has fixed
physical characteristics, and as such, will always perform its anticipated func-
tion — whether alone or in association with other elements. 210 Thus, a
mechanical element cannot function differently or in a new manner unless its
physical characteristics are changed. Under this line of analysis, virtually all
mechanical devices will be precluded from patentability because the individual
elements do not perform any new and different function.'"
"5 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 282 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 60 (1969); Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950); Huron Mach. Prods., Inc, v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc.,
615 F.2d 222, 225 (5th Cir. 1980); John Zinc Co. v. National Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d 547,
551 (5th Cir. 1980); Reed Tool Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 672 F.2d 523, 527 (5th Cir. 1980);
Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d 1086, 1093 (6th Cir. 1980); Deere & Co. v. Hesston
Corp., 593 F.2d 956, 963 (10th Cir. 1979); Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d
644, 648 (8th Cir. 1979).
"6 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. at 282; Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Super-
market Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152; Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 688 F.2d 647, 649-52
(9th Cir. 1982); Huron Mach. Prods., Inc. v. A. & E. Warbern, Inc., 615 F.2d at 224-25; John
Zinc Co. v. National Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d at 551; Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d
at 1093; Reinke Mfg. Co. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d at 648; International Tel. & Tel.
Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453, 457 (1st Cir. 1976).
207 Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. at 152; NDM
Corp. v. Hayes Prods., Inc., 641 F.2d 1274, 1280 (9th Cir. 1981); John Zinc Co. v. National
Airoil Burner Co., 613 F.2d at 551; M-C Indus., Inc. v. Precision Dynamics Corp., 634 F.2d
1211, 1213 (9th Cir. 1980); Smith v. ACME Gen. Corp., 614 F.2d at 1093; International Tel. &
Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d at 457.
Other definitions of synergism include; E-T Indus., Inc. v. Whittaker Corp., 523 F.2d
636, 641 (7th Cir. 1976) ("the combination must produce a result other than the anticipated sum
of the several parts"); International Tel. & Tel. Corp. v. Raychem Corp., 538 F.2d 453 (1976)
("results in an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately"); Gentleman
Mfg., Inc. v. Lawn 'N' Sport, 517 F.2d 1194, 1199 (7th Cir. 1975) ("the elements take on a sur-
prising quality"); Panduit Corp. v. Burndy Corp., 517 F.2d 535, 539 (7th Cir. 1975) (the ele-
ments must, in the aggregate, produce new, unusual or striking results"); Reese v. Elkhart
Welding & Boiler Works, Inc., 447 F.2d 517, 526 (7th Cir. 1971) ("the results must be un-
achieved by prior art structures").
299 See cases cited supra note 205.
209 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach, Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1981); Republic
Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 1979).
2 " Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545 (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
2" Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
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Elements of a combination device, however, can produce a new and dif-
ferent function. It is precisely the manner in which the elements interact to
achieve a desired result that synergism is present. 212 The elements in any com-
bination device, rather than performing a single function, perform functions
which are both similar to and different from those performed in the prior art. 213
By definition, the elements of a combination device will always perform the
same function, even though they operate with other different elements in new
combinations. 214 Such elements can also perform a "new and different func-
tion" than that performed in the prior art, however, when the function of the
elements is described in terms of the role those elements play in producing the
particular result brought about by the discovery. 215 Thus, depending upon the
description of the elements' roles in the apparatus, it can perform both "the
same function" and a function "new and different" from that in the prior art
devices. 2 ' 6
This current definition of synergism, requiring the elements of a device to
perform a "new and different function," is reminiscent of the "combina-
tion/aggregation" distinction of the pre-1952 rules of invention. 217 This defini-
tion necessarily relates to the manner in which the elements interact because
there can be no new and different function without an interaction of the
elements. Synergism, as thus defined, can only exist in a "combination," not
an "aggregation. "216 A finding that a device exhibits a synergistic effect,
however, does not dictate necessarily that the device is nonobvious under section
103. The mere presence of a new and different function does not mean neces-
sarily that the association of elements which produced that function was nonob-
vious. 219 It may have been apparent to one versed in the art that the new and
different function would result. In addition, the elements of all combination
devices, both obvious and nonobvious, perform similar as well as new and dif-
ferent functions. 22° An apparatus is obvious when the selection of elements
needed to produce its result was obvious. Yet this selection may not prevent the
elements from functioning in a new and different, albeit obvious, manner.
(1950); Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 592 F.2d at 970. See also Application of Menough, 323 F.2d 1011, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1963);
Nikola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 912 n.22 (6th Cir. 1978).
212 Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1319 n.15 (9th Cir. 1983).
213 Id.
	 •
214 Id. For example, in a clock radio, a clock will always function as a clock, and a radio
will always function as a radio.
210 Id. In the above example, the clock may be utilized to activate the radio at a particu-
lar time. In such case, the clock's function can be described not only in definitional terms, but
also with regard to the clock's new function of activating the radio.
216 Id.
217 See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
210 Where there is no new or different function, the courts have found an
"aggregation."
219 Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1318 ri.10, 319 n.15 (9th Cir. 1983).
220 See supra notes 212-16 and accompanying text,
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2. A Combined Effect Greater Than the Sum of the Several Effects Taken
Separately
According to the second definition of synergism, some courts hold a com-
bination device to be synergistic when the association of elements "results in
an effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately. /221
As the Great Atlantic Court observed, "[t]he conjunction or concert of known
elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds
the sum of its parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable. " 222 Whereas
the previous definition of synergism focuses on the function of the individual
elements in their interrelationship, the present definition focuses on the result
achieved by that interrelationship. A combination device cannot produce
physically a result exceeding the sum of the individual effects. 223 As previously
noted, a mechanical element may not function differently in association with
other elements than it did in the prior art. Therefore, mechanical elements are
limited to their physical characteristics. 224 When assembled, elements can only
"contribute to the combination the mechanical functions of which they are in-
herently capable. . . . [T]hus the performance of the combination will always
equal the sum of the functions of its components and rarely, if ever, exceed the
sum of its parts." 225 Courts following this rationale have rejected synergism as
a requirement of patentability for combination devices. 226 This requirement
that a combination device must produce a result which is greater than the sum
of its parts is only an alluring figure of speech, employed merely to indicate that
the desired effect results from the interaction of the individual components. An
identical result cannot be reproduced by the independent operation of the in-
dividual elements. 227
 In this regard, synergism, defined in terms of an "effect
greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately," also corresponds
to the "combination/aggregation" distinction explored earlier. 228
221 See cases cited supra note 206.
222
 Great Atl, and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152
(1950).
223
 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Republic
Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 1979)); Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
224 See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
222 Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 n.21 (7th Cir. 1979).
The appearance of synergism defined in terms of a result exceeding the sum of the individual ef-
fects arguably is a consequence of insufficient knowledge of the properties of the component
parts. This insufficiency of knowledge is relevant to the issue of nonobviousness, although not an
independent test for it. Accordingly, the appearance of a result greater than the sum of its parts,
the customary test for synergism, is actually subsumed under the nonobviousness standard of
section 103 and the Graham analysis. Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963,
970 n.21 (7th Cir. 1979).
226
 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. CO., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1981) (citing Republic
Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 1979)); Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
227 Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
2" See supra notes 37-52 and accompanying text.
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3. Unusual and Surprising Consequences
Finally, while the requirement that a combination device produce "un-
usual and surprising consequences" has been attributed to the synergism doc-
trine,'" it more clearly pertains to the nonobviousness prerequisite of section
103. Combination devices, by definition, consist of elements known in the
prior art. 230 Thus defined, neither the device nor the elements would meet the
test of nonobviousness. The selection of elements, however, producing through
their interaction a certain result, may be nonobvious. 231 For example, the
teachings of the prior art may discourage the selection of certain elements, or
the method for combining the elements may be complicated in comparison to
the methods employed in the prior art: the elements selected may produce such
"new and different functions" that their use would not have been apparent."'
Accordingly, where the results produced through the interaction of previously
known elements are "unusual and surprising," the apparatus has satisfied the
nonobviousness requirement of section 103. It is this aspect of the Great Atlantic
language, mistakenly attributed to the synergism doctrine, which more correct-
ly belongs to the nonobviousness doctrine.
4. Summary
The Great Atlantic Court, therefore, offered three definitions of synergism,
and therefore patentability. Actually, however, only two definitions corre-
sponded to the etymology of synergism — the presence of a "new and different
function," or a "greater effect." These definitions aid in the determination of
the "combination/aggregation" distinction, and thereby are merely phrases
for distinguishing "combinations" from "aggregations." Section 103, how-
ever, requires the presence of an element beyond the mere existence of a "new
and different function" or a "greater effect." The "unusual and surprising"
language found in Great Atlantic and thought to be an alternative definition of
synergism is, in actuality, a prototype of section 103 nonobviousness.
C. Judicial Confusion: Description and Prescription
Unfortunately, courts currently have not been conscious of the critical dis-
229 See cases cited supra note 207.
230 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 274 (1976); Anderson's-Black Rock, Inc. v.
Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57, 59 (1969); Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket
Equip. Corp., 340 U,S. 147, 150-51, 152 (1950).
231
	
v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983); Rengo
Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545-46 (3d Cir. 1981) (quoting B.G. Corp. v. Walter
Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1935)); Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics
of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979) (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1979)); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d at 971.
232 Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d at 1318 n.10; Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach.
Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46 (quoting B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d at 21-22); Plastic
Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics, 607 F.2d at 905 n.48 (quoting Republic Indus., Inc. v.
Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971); Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
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tinctions among the terms "combination," "aggregation," "synergism," and
"nonobviousness." The gradual erosion of these distinctions has precipitated
the confusion among the circuits regarding the proper standards of patentabili-
ty for devices consisting of previously known elements.
First, the courts have ignored the proper distinction between the terms
"combination" and "aggregation." Courts currently employ the term "com-
bination" to signify any device consisting of more than one element, either a
real "combination" or an "aggregation.' '233 The elements of a "combination,"
properly defined, however, must cooperate integrally, producing a result due
to the combined effect of the several parts and not simply from the separate ac-
tion of each. 234 In contrast, an "aggregation" implies the mere union of two or
More unrelated elements, independently performing the same function in the
same way as they did when used alone, but without interaction or cooperation. 235
Second, courts currently view Great Atlantic as offering three definitions of
synergism, and therefore patentability. Accordingly, combination devices are
variously considered synergistic when the individual elements of the device
"result in a [combined] effect greater than the sum of the several parts taken
separately," 226
 perform a "new and different function" 237 or produce "unus-
ual and surprising consequences. " "6 Actually, only two definitions correspond
to the etymology of synergism, as thus examined, namely the presence of a
"new and different function," or a "greater effect." The "unusual and sur-
prising" language found in Great Atlantic and thought to be an alternative defi-
nition of synergism is, in actuality, a prototype of section 103 nonobviousness.
Indeed, section 103 may be seen as the statutory counterpart of the "unusual
and surprising" facet of earlier definitions of synergism.
Third, courts addressing this issue fail to realize that synergism, properly
defined in terms of a "new or different function," or "greater effect," is mere-
ly a rhetorical means for distinguishing "combinations" from "aggregations"
— that is, for isolating those devices which exhibit the requisite interaction
among the component parts from those devices which do not. For the purposes
of patent claim analysis, therefore, the terms "synergism" and "combination"
are synonymous.
Fourth, a confusion similar to that concerning the terms "combination"
and "invention" discussed in the Great Atlantic decision exists today regarding
the terms "synergism" and "nonobviousness." Just as courts prior to Great
Atlantic were trying to claim that the existence of a "combination" mandates a
finding of invention — rather than being a condition precedent to such a find-
ing as required in Great Atlantic — some courts arc attempting to assert that the
2" See cases cited supra notes 130, 136.
"' See cases cited supra note 180.
235
 Id.
"6 See cases cited supra note 206.
2" See cases cited supra note 205.
"5 See cases cited supra note 207.
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presence of synergistic qualities alone mandates a finding of nonobviousness. 239
Synergism, although a condition precedent to nonobviousness, does not man-
date a finding of patentability under the nonobviousness standard of section
103 and the Graham analysis. Synergism, as a condition precedent of nonobvi-
ousness, may be useful in determining the validity of a combination device. An
absence of synergism, indicating the existence of a mere aggregation, will
signify obviousness, hence unpatentability. In this way, the synergism doctrine
distinguishes between those devices which may be patentable and those which
are not. The presence of synergism, however, indicating the existence of a
patentable device, does not necessarily mandate a finding of nonobviousness.
The very selection and arrangement of elements which produce a desired result
could have been either not "inventive" or "obvious" to a person acquainted
with the prior art. Patentability, however, requires more than the obvious se-
lection and arrangement of components.
As a condition precedent for nonobviousness, the synergism doctrine, al-
though not a separate test for patentability independent of section 103, can be
seen therefore, as a useful guide for scrutinizing combination devices. In addi-
tion to the arguments advanced above, however, there are other reasons why
synergism should not be understood as another shibboleth for nonobviousness.
Examination of the common definitions of synergism broached in Great Atlantic
reveals that the doctrine corresponds to the "combination/aggregation" dis-
tinction of the pre-1952 rules of invention. Courts which oppose this "combi-
nation/aggregation" distinction, however, maintain that the requirements of
section 103 of the Patent Act of 1952 apply to all patent claims, regardless of
their subject matter. 2" They argue that this universality of application is attrib-
uted to a Congressional intent to replace the previous rules of invention, many
of which were applicable only to a limited range of patents, with a single stand-
ard of nonobviousness. 2 " According to these courts, there appears to be no
justification for determining the patentability of a combination device by a dif-
ferent standard than any other type of discovery. 242 In fact, "it would confound
the statutory design to impose on any class of patents a harsher test of patenta-
bility than the rest. " 243 The Supreme Court, however, in Great Atlantic and
Sakraida has recognized "synergism" to a limited extent as a term symbolizing
the more stringent standard for patent claims involving more than one ele-
See cases cited supra notes 130, 136.
240 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 544 (3d Cir. 1981); Plastic Con-
tainer Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979);
Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1979).
24 ' Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Plastic Container Corp. v. Conti-
nental Plastics of Ok., Inc. 607, F.2d at 905 n.48; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d at 971.
2" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 544; Plastic Container Corp, v. Conti-
nental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 ,F.2d at 905 n.48; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,
592 F.2d at 971.
249 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1981).
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ment. 244 Where a combination device is involved, special scrutiny into its ob-
viousness may be necessary because of the improbability of finding patentabili-
ty in a device composed of previously known elements. 245 The Supreme Court,
in Great Atlantic and Sakraida, consistently emphasized this basic precept
concerning the stricter degree of scrutiny under which combination devices are
judged. 246
In addition to finding the "combination/aggregation" distinction incon-
sistent with the language of section 103, opponents of this distinction argue that
because synergism relates exclusively to "combinations," as distinguished
from "aggregations," the scope of the synergism doctrine derives from the
definition of the term "combination." 247
 Courts which oppose a more exacting
scrutiny for combination devices argue that no standard can be articulated for
such devices. 248 According to this view, most mechanical devices consist of
previously known elements interacting in different "combinations. " 249
 The
presence or absence of interaction under the synergism doctrine, these courts
state, is not useful in determining the nonobviousness of a device clearly sug-
gested by the prior art. 25° Proponents of this position, however, fail to
recognize that one important purpose of the synergism doctrine is to
distinguish "combinations" from "aggregations" and, hence, to distinguish
devices which may be nonobvious and therefore patentable from those which
are not. 251
 In this regard, synergism, as a condition precedent to a finding of
nonobviousness is an important consideration in determining patentability
under section 103.
Opponents of the synergism doctrine also argue that synergism conflicts
with the language of section 103 and the Supreme Court's repeated insistence
that section 103 and the tripartite Graham analysis be followed strictly in deter-
mining the nonobviousness .of a discovery. 252 According to these courts, any
244 Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 281 (quoting Great Ad. and Pac. Tea Co. v.
Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950)).
243 Id. The rationale for this stricter scrutiny of combination devices is that a patent can
only be sustained when it effectuates its purpose of augmenting the sum of useful knowledge. A
patented apparatus consisting of previously known elements could possibly withdraw from the
prior art resources freely available to skilled persons. This withdrawal of resources is a result not
intended by either Congress or the Courts, and indeed, would violate the Constitutional mandate
that new discoveries eventually must become the property of all people. Great Ad. and Pac. Tea
Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
246 id.
247 Rengo Co, v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545 (3d Cir. 1981); Republic
Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 1979).
248 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
248 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage
Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970; Nikola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898, 912,n.22 (6th Cir. 1978); Reeves
Instrument Corp. v. Bechman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263, 270 n.4 (9th Cir. 1971); B.G.
Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 21-22 (2d Cir. 1935).
288 Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 970.
281
 The absence of interaction, on the other hand, and therefore the absence of syner-
gism, successfully demonstrates obviousness under the Patent Act of 1952. Id. at 970-71.
262, Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d 535, 545-46 (3d Cir. 1981); Plastic Con-
May 19831	 SYNERGISM AND NON-OBVIOUSNESS	 735
assessment of the obviousness of a discovery under section 103 and the Graham
analysis must be made with reference to the level of skill existing in the perti-
nent art at the time the discovery was made. 253 The synergism test, in contrast,
they note, compels courts to focus exclusively on the performance of the
elements after they are discovered. 254 Furthermore, they conclude, synergism,
by referring exclusively to the functioning of the individual elements after they
are combined, necessarily assumes that it is always obvious to select and com-
bine known elements to produce a particular result. 266
In certain circumstances, however, the selection of the elements and for-
mation of the apparatus may itself be nonobvious under the standards of sec-
tion 103 and therefore patentable. 266 As one recent court observed, elements
may be combined in infinitely many variations. The selection of elements,
which when combined produce a desired result, "may require a high degree of
originality." It is the very selection of these elements which is the
innovation. 257 Therefore, because the synergism doctrine primarily concerns
the performance of the elements after combination and without regard to the
obviousness of selecting the component elements of the apparatus, opponents
argue that synergism converts a mere difference in the degree of obviousness
into a separate standard of patentability which fails to comply with section 103
and the Graham mandate. The opponents fail to recognize, however, that syn-
ergism is important as an indicia, rather than a synonym of nonobviousness.
Synergism only attempts to distinguish nonpatentable "aggregations" from
"combinations" which may be patentable under section 103.
CONCLUSION
The present controversy among the circuit courts of appeals concerning
patent validity results from the notion that synergism may be an additional
criterion of patentability for combination devices. The inconsistent formula-
tions and applications of the patent standards has resulted in an unpredictable
body of law which has successfully undermined the primary objective of the
patent system as articulated in the Constitution: "to promote the progress of
tamer Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d 885, 905 n.48 (10th Cir. 1979);
Republic Indus., Inc. v.•Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
2" Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46; Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d at 905 n.48; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
254 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46; Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d at 905 n.48; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
235 Rengo Co. v. Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46; Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Ok., Inc., 607 F.2d at 905 n.48; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock
Co., 592 F.2d at 971.
256 Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof, 697 F.2d 1313, 1318 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983); Rengo Co. v.
Molins Mach. Co., 657 F.2d at 545-46; Plastic Container Corp. v. Continental Plastics of Ok.,
Inc., 607 F.2d at 905 n.48; Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d•at 971.
257 B.G. Corp. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 79 F.2d 20, 22 (2d Cir. 1935). See also Applica-
tion of Menough, 323 F.2d 1011, 1015 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
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useful arts and discoveries." It is necessary, therefore, to formulate and adopt
a consistent standard of patentability for combination devices.
The preceding analysis has demonstrated that the etymological derivation
of the term "synergism," as applied to devices consisting of previously known
elements, distinguishes those discoveries which are "combinations" from those
which are mere "aggregations." This distinction between "combinations"
and "aggregations" exists in the pre-1952 case law surrounding the judicial
evolution of the Hotchkiss invention standard. The Great Atlantic Court recog-
nized this distinction, but noted that it was insufficient as the sole determinant
of patentability under this standard. According to the Great Atlantic Court, a
device consisting of previously known elements may be patentable if, in addi-
tion to being a "combination" possessing the requisite interaction of the indi-
vidual elements, the device produced "unusual and surprising consequences"
from the interaction of the elements. A finding that a device was a "combina-
tion," therefore, was a condition precedent to a finding that it was "inventive."
In the Patent Act of 1952, Congress attempted to eliminate the judicial
disparity surrounding the interpretation of the invention standard by enacting
a more objective standard: nonobviousness. Nonobviousness, however, is
merely a new rubric for the old invention requirement, defined in terms of
"more ingenuity and skill than that possessed by an ordinary mechanic"
under Hotchkiss or "unusual or surprising consequences" under Great Atlantic.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has continued to require, under the nonobvi-
ousness standard of section 103, the interaction of elements in combination
devices. This search for interaction among the elements is couched in the
rhetoric of synergism, defined in terms of a "new or different function," or a
"greater combined effect."
Synergism, as a condition precedent of nonobviousness, may be useful in
determining the validity of a combination device. Properly applied, an absence
of synergism, indicating the existence of a mere aggregation, will signify that
the device is obvious under section 103, hence unpatentable. Yet, the presence
of synergism, although indicating the existence of interaction among the
elements does not necessarily mandate a finding that the device is nonobvious
under section 103. The very selection and arrangement of elements which pro-
duced a desired result could have been apparent, at the time the discovery was
made, to a person skilled in the pertinent art. As a condition precedent of non-
obviousness, therefore, the synergism doctrine, although it does not bear any
ipso facto relationship to the nonobviousness, may be seen as a useful guide for
scrutinizing combination devices under section 103 and the tripartite Graham
analysis.
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